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Drug abuse is perhaps one of the most pervasive social issues across the globe
and throughout history. From alcoholism to opium dens, and from marijuana to
ecstasy, every nation has had to address some form of drug abuse at one time or
another. Some have taken a relatively relaxed approach, while others have
embarked on a widespread campaign to eliminate drug abuse completely Which
of these approaches is more effective or desirable is not at issue in this Note.
What is at issue in this Note is the fact that-regardless of how relaxed or strict a
nation's drug policy may be-every nation faces the same fundamental issue: to
what lengths are we willing to go in order to bring drug abuse to the desired
level? What freedoms may be sacrificed in the name offighting drug abuse, and
by how much may they be sacrificed?
The specific freedom at issue in this Note is the freedom of musical expression,
and the specific drug control policies at issue are a group of proposed or
enacted laws that to some degree hold owners and promoters of music events
liable for drug abuse that occurs during their events. More specifically, these
laws address the abuse of "club drugs," and include the Illicit Drug Anti-
Proliferation Act (or the RAVE Act), the Ecstasy Awareness Act, the CLEAN-UP
of Methamphetamines Act, and the Ecstasy Prevention Act.
This Note lays out a framework of arguments for and against these laws, in an
attempt to illuminate the discussion of two underlying issues. First, is the
potential loss of artistic expression and speech caused by these laws justified by
the nature of the club drug problem? Second, are those laws the best means to
achieve the desired level of control over club drugs?
I. INTRODUCTION
Toronto. August 1, 2000. As the evening hours approach, people begin to
gather downtown in Nathan Philips Square-first by the hundreds, then by the
thousands-ultimately swelling to a crowd of twenty thousand.' For months,
Toronto has banned raves from city property, and on the eve of the city council's
vote to possibly end this ban, concerned citizens and music enthusiasts have come
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1 See Ben Rayner, Time to Embrace Techno-Music Tourism, TORONTO STAR, June 1,
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out en masse for the iDance rally, to make their voices heard.2 The city has
labeled raves a dangerous breeding ground for drugs, guns, and violence, 3 but the
DJs and speakers at the rally are trying to portray a different picture, and
showcase the positive and unique values that raves represent-both in art and
community.4 The outcome? The city council got the message, and voted fifty to
four to lift the ban.5
Two hundred forty miles away, just across the quiet waters of the Detroit
River, lies the birthplace of techno music,6 in a country that was only just
beginning to respond to its own problem of drug use at raves. In this year, the
Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 20007 was passed with little attention,8 almost
offhandedly mentioning "raves" as a synonym for locations of ecstasy use.9 Over
the next three years, four more acts1 ° would be introduced in Congress that would
tighten the legislative link between raves and drugs, and a number of cities would
begin to take their own anti-drug measures aimed at raves. 11
2 See Ben Rayner, Rallying For The Right to a Ravin' Good Time, TORONTO STAR, Aug.
2, 2000, at D5, LEXIS, News & Business, Toronto Star File.
3 Rayner, supra note 1 (noting that the city's ban was prompted by "months of inflated
anti-drug hysteria and unfounded police claims of violence and guns at dance events").
4 Sean Stanleigh, Analysis: Peaceful Rave Rally Was a Seminal Event, TORONTO STAR,
Aug. 4, 2000, at B4, LEXIS, News & Business, Toronto Star File.
5 Id. The promoters of the iDance rally also stressed that the rally was important for
"opening a dialogue between promoters and the police and 'giving the electronic-party industry
some cultural legitimacy in the eyes of the media."' Ben Rayner, Rave Culture Celebration
Cancelled, TORONTO STAR, July 17, 2002, at D 1, LEXIS, News & Business, Toronto Star File.
6 Rayner, supra note 1.
7 Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, S. 2612, 106th Cong. (2000). This Act mainly
authorizes funds to educate the public about ecstasy use, and to study the health effects of
ecstasy use. Id.
8 Children's Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, §§ 3661-73, 114 Stat. 1101, 1241-
46(2000).
9 Id. § 3662(3).
10 Ecstasy Prevention Act of 2001, H.R. 2582, 107th Cong. (2001); Reducing Americans'
Vulnerability to Ecstasy Act [RAVE Act], S. 2633, 107th Cong. (2002); Clean, Learn, Educate,
Abolish, Neutralize, and Undermine Production of Methamphetamines Act of 2002 [CLEAN-
UP of Methamphetamines Act], S. 2763, 107th Cong. (2002); Ecstasy Awareness Act of 2003,
H.R. 2962, 108th Cong. (2003).
11 See, e.g., Looking the Other Way: Rave Promoters and Club Drugs: Hearing Before
the Senate Judiciary Caucus on Int'l Narcotics Control, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter
Hearings: Looking the Other Way] (statement of Asa Hutchinson, Adm'r, Drug Enforcement
Admin.) (noting use of nuisance ordinances and health codes to shut down raves in Hartford
and South Carolina cities), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ctl20401.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
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It was enough to incite iDance's American counterparts to now make their
collective voice heard. On September 6, 2002, thousands of people gathered at
coordinated rallies in New York, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., San Francisco,
Albuquerque, and other cities, to protest the RAVE Act as it sat in Congress. 12 As
in Toronto, these rallies appeared to be successful: over fifty thousand people
faxed protests to Washington, two senators withdrew their sponsorship of the bill,
and the Act was eventually tabled. 13 But even before there was a chance to
regroup, the RAVE Act was effectively resurrected and passed the following
year. 14 Another nationwide, multi-city rally was organized to protest the bill
again--even if it was too late to prevent its passage. 15 Were these protests a
failure? Futile?
Besides their individual importance-with regard to a specific issue or law-
these protests are important as collectively serving a broader purpose. Together,
they constitute exchanges in an ongoing public debate about drug policy. And
whether the specific issue under debate is rave bans in Toronto, the RAVE Act in
our own federal government, or state and local laws restricting raves, there is an
underlying issue uniting them all. That issue is the degree to which drug
enforcement policy should expand from liability for a person's direct
manufacture, sale, or use of drugs, to liability for those not directly involved. This
Note focuses on one specific aspect of this expansion of liability: the move from
liability for direct involvement in the sale or use of drugs to liability for owners
and promoters of events at which drug activity occurs.
Existing drug laws are generally premised on the idea that a person must have
actually participated in the use or sale of controlled substances. 16 The one
possible exception to this general rule is the so-called "crack house law," which
creates liability for maintaining drug-involved premises. 17 As interpreted by the
courts, this law can be applied when landowners know of drug activity on their
12 See Margarita Ortega y Gomez, Right to Dance is Not a Crime, UNIVERSrrY WIRE,
March 13, 2003; Christine Pelisek, The Crack-House Rave, L.A. WEEKLY, Sept. 13, 2002, at
17. This rally was collectively called "Freedom to Dance." Id.
13 See Jason Bracelin, The Law Won, CLEvELAND SCENE, April 23, 2003, at 51.
14 See id. The RAVE Act expands 21 U.S.C. § 856 in ways intended to make it more
applicable to rave promoters and owners. See infra Part IV.B.
15 See Steve Baltin, A Day to Shake Your Body Politic, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2003, at E18.
This rally was titled "Freedom to Dance 2: Show Our Strength," and occurred simultaneously
in Los Angeles, Seattle, New York, and Washington, D.C. on May 31,2003. Id.
16 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-64 (2000).
17 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2000). In general, this law imposes liability on landowners who do not
physically partake in the manufacture, sale, or use of drugs, but intentionally allow their
property to be used by others for those purposes. See id.; see also infra Part 1V.B.
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property, but do not intend to participate in that activity.18 But due to careful
charging and prosecution, persons have only been convicted of this law when
they have directly participated in drug activity. 19
Recently, this pattern of prosecutions has changed in response to a newly
perceived form of drug abuse: the phenomenon of "club drugs."20 The rapid rise
in the abuse of these drugs2 ' and their resistance to traditional enforcement
measures22 have finally prompted prosecutors to take advantage of the judicial
expansion of the crack house law. After long and costly investigations of several
music entertainment venues,2 3 prosecutors have forgone charges against drug
dealers and instead arrested the owners and promoters of the venues. 24 These
persons were charged under the crack house law even though there were no
allegations or evidence that they were actually involved in, or intended to be
involved in, drug trafficking.25 Each of these charges failed to result in a
conviction, 26 but prosecutors made it clear that they felt the responsibility for the
18 See United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tamez,
941 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1993).
Although subsection (a)(2) of this law requires a person to have both knowledge of drug
activity and a purpose to engage in that activity, the courts have held that requiring the accused
to have the purpose would make subsection (a)(2) duplicative of (a)(1). Therefore, the courts
have ruled that it is the person being allowed to use the accused's property that must have the
purpose of engaging in drug activity. See Chen, 913 F.2d at 188-92.
19 See Reducing Americans' Vulnerability to Ecstasy Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 5519
Before the House Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 21 & n. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Hearings: RAVE Act] (prepared
statement of Graham Boyd, Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/82263.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
20 Essentially, club drugs are any drugs commonly used at nightclubs and raves. See infra
Part ll.A.
21 See infra Part V.A.1.
22 See infra Part V.A.2.
23 Police raided Club La Vela, home to MTV's Spring Break in Panama City Beach,
Florida, in April 2000. See Mike Clements, Police Shut Down Party of Thousands, NEWS
HERALD (Panama City Beach, Fla.), April 29, 2000, http://www.newsherald.com (last visited
Feb. 25, 2005). In August, 2000, the DEA raided the State Palace Theater in New Orleans. See
McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404,406 (5th Cir. 2003).
24 Many of these drug dealers received immunity for their crimes in exchange for their
testimony against the owners and promoters. See David Angier, La Vela Jurors Cite Lack of
"Hard Evidence," NEWS HERALD (Panama City Beach, Fla.), Dec. 5, 2001,
http://www.newsherald.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
25 See United States v. Brunet, No. 01-CR-10 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2001); United States v.
Pfeffer, No. 5-01-CR-07-RH (N.D. Fla. 2001).
26 The charges against the owner and promoter of the State Palace Theater were dropped,
and the managing company of the theater entered into a plea agreement. McClure, 335 F.3d at
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drug activity at these events did not fall on individual dealers or users, but on the
owners and promoters of the events.27
In response to these acquittals, members of Congress felt that new tools were
needed to respond to the problem of club drugs. The crack house law was
amended to make it more applicable to rave owners and promoters,28 and two
new bills were introduced that would 'greatly expand this form of indirect
liability.29 These latter Acts would impose liability on any owners or promoters
who simply had knowledge-or even reason to know-that drug use was
occurring during their events.30 To that extent, they represent a clear departure
from existing drug laws.
While there may be specific aspects of the club drug phenomenon that justify
taking some kind of new enforcement measures, there are also legitimate
concerns about pursuing expanded liability for owners and promoters of
entertainment events as a solution. In particular, such laws, either as written or as
applied by law enforcement, may discriminate against certain forms of music or
speech.31 Also, business owners allege that such laws are inherently vague, and
offer them no guidance or protection for running a legitimate event where drug
activity occurs despite any measures taken to prevent it.32 And still other critics
claim that regardless of these problems, such laws will ultimately be ineffective at
solving the problems associated with club drugs.33 However, since the idea of
holding a landowner liable for wrongful acts committed on their property by
another person is not without precedent, 34 there is no reason to presume that it is
406-07. The owners of Club La Vela were acquitted after seventy-five minutes of deliberation.
See, e.g., David Angier, La Vela Officials Acquitted, NEWS HERALD (Panama City Beach, Fla.),
Nov. 28, 2001, http://www.newsherald.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
27 The prosecutor in the State Palace Theater case acknowledged that filing charges under
the crack house law was a "reach." Apparently, the authorities felt the promoters and owners
were guilty of something, and the crack house law was "the only statute that seemed to fit."
Donna Leinwand, Cities Crack Down on Raves, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 2003, at Al (quoting
prosecuting attorney Al Winters).
28 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 [PROTECT Act], Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 608, 117 Stat. 650, 691-92 (2003); see
also 149 CONG. REC. S1678 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden) (noting that the
results from these two cases showed the crack house law needed to be amended to adapt to the
rave environment).
29 CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act, S. 2763, 107th Cong. (2002); Ecstasy
Awareness Act of 2003, H.R- 2962, 108th Cong. (2003).
30 S. 2763 § 305; H.R. 2962 § 2.
31 See infra Part V.B.3.
32 See infra Part V.B.2.
33 See infra Part V.B.1.
34 For example, some states hold individuals liable if they knowingly allow someone to
commit acts of prostitution on their property and fail to abate that use. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN.
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inherently without merit. Rather, other examples of "permissive" liability may
serve as a source of comparison and offer solutions to make an expansion of
liability with respect to drug activity more acceptable, such as including a safe
harbor provision for legitimate business practices.
These concerns have certainly not gone unnoticed, but the public discussion
and debate over the merits of this expansion in liability have not always been
particularly fruitful or constructive. Opponents of this expansion have sometimes
confused the various laws at issue35 and attacked the motives of the proponents of
expanded liability.36 For their part, proponents of this expansion have often failed
to acknowledge the positive aspects of the art and community that are likely to be
affected by their laws37 or to respond to the legitimate concerns raised by their
critics.38
Therefore, the primary goal of this Note is to lay out a framework of the legal
and public policy issues at the center of the debate on expanding liability to
owners and promoters of entertainment events as a measure to address the abuse
of club drugs. As such, Part II discusses the nature of the club drug phenomenon,
by outlining the rave subculture often associated with these drugs, and providing a
background on the specific substances commonly designated as club drugs. Part
1H then details some of the enforcement policies that have been taken at the city,
state, and federal levels which show that responsibility for the club drug
phenomenon is no longer being placed only on those directly involved in drug
activity. Following this, Part IV introduces specific legislation at the federal level
that has sought to expand liability for drug activity to the owners and promoters of
the raves and entertainment events at which it occurs. Part V then introduces a
framework for considering the merits of this expansion in liability. It first explains
why such a framework is needed, and then outlines the positions on either side of
the expansion. Part VI then seeks to advance this discussion by offering two
suggestions that do much to relieve concerns on both sides: a safe harbor
provision and content-neutral drafting.
STAT. § 53a-89 (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1355 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.070
(Michie 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.40 (McKinney 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.88.090 (West 2000); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 28.25(4) (2003).
35 See, e.g., 149 CoNG. REc. S 10,607 (daily ed. July 31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden);
149 CONG. REc. S5153 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden).
36 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S1678 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(noting opponents have accused him of merely wanting to "ban dancing, kill the 'rave scene' or
silence electronic music"); see also infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RAVES AND CLUB DRUGS
The issue of club drugs has been called "one of the most startling law
enforcement and social issues facing the United States in the early part of the
twenty-first century."'39 It has been the subject of a multi-million dollar
educational campaign, 40 the target of legislation 4' and enforcement programs,
4 2
and the topic of a continuous and heated public debate.43 But what exactly are
"club drugs," and what is it about them that has raised such pointed concerns?
More importantly, what is it about club drugs that makes it more or less desirable
or effective to treat them as a group--whether it be for purposes of education,
legislation, or enforcement?
A. The Rise of Raves and Club Drugs
As their collective label implies, club drugs are a particular group of illegal
substances commonly encountered at and associated with nightclubs and raves.
44
Although this term is often used in a rather vague and inexact manner, the list of
club drugs is generally composed of MDMA (Ecstasy), Methamphetamine,
Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol), Gamma Hydroxybutyric Acid (GHB), Ketamine
(Special K), and LSD.45 Most of these drugs have been in existence for several
decades, but it is only since the late 1980s that their collective abuse began to
attract the attention of our government and media.4 6 It was around this time that
39 Videotape: Ecstasy & Other Club Drugs: Dancing with Darkness (Drug Enforcement
Admin.) [hereinafter DEA Video], available at
http://www.phatnetwork.net/emdef/thevideo.mov (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (statement of
Donnie Marshall, Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.).
40 See Larry Smith, E-fer Madness, Sept. 16, 2003, at
http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/20O3/09/16/ecstasy retraction/index np.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2005) (noting the government's $54 million educational campaign on club drugs in
1999).
41 See infra Part IV.
42 See infra Part In.
43 See, e.g., David Montgomery, Ravers Against the Machine: Partiers and ACLU Take
on 'Ecstasy'Legislation, WASH. POST, July 18, 2002, at Al.
4 4 Hearings: Looking the Other Way, supra note 11 (statement of Asa Hutchinson,
Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.).
45 Id.
46 See Ecstasy: Underestimating the Threat: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Caucus
on Int'l Narcotic Control, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Hearings: Underestimating the
Threat] (statement of Steven S. Martin, Scientist, Ctr. for Drug and Alcohol Studies, Univ. of
Del.), available at http://www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/ecstasy00index.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2005); Hearings: RA VEAct, supra note 19, at 8.
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the European "rave" scene-events generally characterized by electronic music
and elaborate light and visual productions, often lasting from late at night into the
early morning hours-began to appear in the United States.47
As with its European counterpart, the American rave scene grew quickly
while remaining a relatively "underground" movement of youth subculture.48
This movement was morally united by a value system known as "PLUR" (Peace,
Love, Unity, and Respect), which overtly rejected the materialism of the "me"
generation.49 In addition to this, the rave subculture rapidly generated a particular
visual and musical aesthetic which was both distinctive and unusual. Some of the
more recognizable stereotypes of the rave subculture's visual aesthetic include
baggy, lightweight clothing, and accessories such as pacifiers, candy necklaces,
glitter body paint, and glow-sticks.50 Musically, raves are associated with a form
of electronic music called "techno," described as "dance music with a fast,
47 Hearings: Looking the Other Way, supra note 11 (statement of Asa Hutchinson,
Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.). In many cases, raves are scheduled from night until
morning in order to avoid local curfew restrictions. Id.
48 DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., RAVES, at http://www.dea.gov/ongoing/raves.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005) [hereinafter DEA: RAVEs]. The growth of raves in the United States was
both accompanied and facilitated by the growth of the internet. Since information about raves
was often communicated through word-of-mouth, intemet chat rooms were an effective
medium for quickly spreading information about the location and other details of upcoming
raves. See id; Hearings: Looking the Other Way, supra note 11 (statement of Asa Hutchinson,
Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.).
4 9 Erica Weir, Raves: A Review of the Culture, the Drugs and the Prevention of Harm,
162 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1843, 1843 (2000), available at
http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/l62/13/1843 (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
50 See NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROD. No. 2001-L0424-
004, INFORMATION BULLETIN: RAVES 2 (2001) [hereinafter INFORMATION BULLEIN: RAVES],
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656p.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
Although most of this style has been explained in terms of its functional value, it seems likely
that by this point in time, dressing in this manner is as much functional as it is a means of
identifying oneself with a particular sub-culture. For example, baggy, lightweight clothing helps
keep ravers cool and unrestrained in movement as they literally dance all night long, and some
people wear pacifiers to alleviate the urge to grind their teeth caused by ecstasy. But because of
the large part that clothing plays in self-identification, this functional value (whether in relation
to dancing or drug use) is likely overshadowed by the desire to identify with other ravers.
Furthermore, the choice of baggy, androgynous clothing diminishes the focus on physical
attractiveness---reinforcing the acceptance that underlies the rave culture's value system and the
rejection of the superficiality of "mainstream" culture. See Weir, supra note 49, at 1843-44; see
generally Chrys Kahn-Egan, Degeneration X: The Artifacts and Lexicon of the Rave
Subculture, 20.3 STUDIES IN POPULAR CULTURE (1998) (discussing the various elements of the
rave aesthetic), available at http://www.pcasacas.org/SPC/spcissues/20.3/kahn-egan.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005).
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pounding beat."'51 But within this rather generic and overinclusive genre, the rave
subculture has spawned a vast array of musical sub-genres, including ambient,
trance, house, jungle, drum 'n' bass, techstep, garage, and big beat.52
As with any subculture, looking or sounding different is likely to raise
eyebrows. But what was most troubling to politicians, parents, and media was the
growing awareness of drug use at raves, in conjunction with the markedly young
age of many rave attendees-most of whom fell between the ages of twelve and
twenty-five. 53 When the rave scene first began to spread to the United States,
many parents believed that raves created a relatively safe environment for their
children, in part because raves are often advertised as "alcohol-free." 54 But what
some of these parents did not realize was that the surreal world of light and sound
that their children would experience during the rave would often also include
exposure to the "flagrant and open drug use" by some attendees.55 As word and
concern spread over the drug abuse present at raves and nightclubs, the issue
came to be christened as the problem of "club drugs."
B. The True Nature of Club Drugs
Apart from where these drugs are used, they share little in common-and
even this association is dissipating as their use disperses throughout the general
population.56 An overview of some of the common club drugs discloses that they
vary widely in terms of their effects, their sources of production, and their
methods of importation. Such variety is important to keep in mind when
considering the efficacy of education, harm-prevention, or enforcement programs
that treat club drugs as a homogenous group.
51 See INFORMATION BuLLETIN: RAVES, supra note 50, at 1.
5 2 Id. at 2.
53 See Hearings: Looking the Other Way, supra note 11 (statement of Asa Hutchinson,
Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.).
54 Id. Promoters often include this in advertisements both because alcohol is not popular
with many rave attendees and because raves are often held in open fields or large, warehouse-
type facilities that do not have liquor licenses. DEA: RAVES, supra note 48.
55 DEA: RAVES, supra note 48.
56 Research on MDM4: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy and Human Res., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Glen R. Hanson, Acting Dir., Nat'l
Inst. on Drug Abuse, Nat'l Inst. of Health, Dep't of Health and Human Servs.), available at
http://www.drugabuse.gov/Testimony/9-19-02Testimony.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
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1. Ecstasy
The technical name for ecstasy is MDMA (3, 4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine).5 7 In its chemical structure, ecstasy is similar
to methamphetamine and mescaline, giving it both stimulant and hallucinogenic
properties. 58 Use of ecstasy generally creates feelings of empathy, euphoria,
peace, heightened sensory perception, as well as restlessness, bnxism
(involuntary grinding of teeth), and hyperthermia. 59 Because of the feelings of
empathy brought on by ecstasy use, some therapists have used ecstasy to treat
patients and couples to help overcome their inhibitions.60 However, as a result of
studies showing a "significant potential for neurotoxicity in lab animals,"6' 1
ecstasy was placed on Schedule I status in 1986.62
Because ecstasy and its precursor chemicals have no recognized medical uses
in the United States, they are not commercially manufactured within this
country.63 And because of the abundant supply of imported ecstasy, there has
57 Id.
5 8 1d.
59 America at Risk: The Ecstasy Threat: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Caucus on
Int'l Narcotics Control, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Hearings: America at Risk] (statement
of Dr. Bill Jacobs, Medical Dir., Gateway Cmty. Servs.), available at
http://www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/ecstasyindex.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).60 Id.
61 Id. Studies on the long-term health effects of ecstasy are currently under debate. The
formerly leading study showing that typical ecstasy use can cause death or damage to serotonin
pathways in the brain was officially retracted by the magazine Science, after it was discovered
that a chemical used in the study was mislabeled, and was actually methamphetamine rather
than ecstasy. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Research on Ecstasy is Clouded by Errors, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2003, at Fl. The results of this study have not been replicated, and a German study has
shown that serotonin levels in average ecstasy users return to normal within six weeks. Id.
However, the dangers of hyperthermia associated with ecstasy are well documented, and there
is evidence that ecstasy use may cause liver damage. See Hearings: America at Risk, supra note
59 (statement of Dr. Bill Jacobs, Medical Dir., Gateway Cmty. Servs.).
62 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2003); see 51 Fed. Reg. 36,552 (Oct. 14, 1986). The DEA initially
tried to place ecstasy on Schedule I status under the emergency scheduling provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act that allow the Attorney General to temporarily schedule a substance
if it is "necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to public safety." 21 U.S.C. § 81 1(h) (2000); see
also 50 Fed. Reg. 23,118 (May 31, 1985) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308). However, this
authority is vested in the Attorney General, who had not subdelegated this power or otherwise
authorized the DEA to make these emergency schedulings. Consequently, this scheduling was
ruled ineffective. United States v. Pees, 645 F. Supp. 697, 704 (D. Colo. 1986). But the DEA
quickly corrected this error by placing ecstasy on permanent Schedule I status through the
standard notice and comment procedure. See 51 Fed. Reg. 36,552.
63 Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Dr. Bill Jacobs, Medical Dir.,
Gateway Cmty. Servs.). Ironically, the consequence of this fact is negative in some respects.
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been little need for drug organizations within the United States to manufacture
ecstasy themselves.64 Furthermore, because ecstasy is a synthetic drug, it does not
need particular geological or climatic conditions for its production.65 As a result,
most production takes place in small laboratories in Europe, and the ecstasy is
then smuggled into the United States and other countries. 66 Because this
production has been mostly confined to Europe,67 the trafficking of ecstasy into
the United States has been dominated by Israeli and Russian organized crime;
only recently have Colombian and Mexican drug organizations become
involved.68 At the street level, ecstasy dealers tend to differ from other drug
dealers in background and appearance in that they often "look like any middle
class, clean cut, young adult."69 Of course, as with all drugs, production and
Where drugs are manufactured commercially, their production must meet certain safety and
quality regulations. Thus, when the drug is diverted from legitimate use, its contents are certain.
But when drugs are manufactured illegally, their makeup and quality is often unknown, or at
least unpredictable, and they may be even more dangerous than the drug that was intended to be
manufactured. This may lead to mistaken buyers overdosing or having other harmful reactions
to the unknown or misrepresented drug. For example, in a three-month period in 2000, six
deaths in Florida were attributed to dangerous variants of ecstasy. Id.
64 Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Donnie Marshall, Adm'r, Drug
Enforcement Admin.). Furthermore, because the necessary precursor chemicals to making
ecstasy are difficult to obtain in the United States, only a very small number of ecstasy
laboratories have been seized within the United States. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG
TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES (2001) [hereinafter DEA: DRUG TRAFFICKING],
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/01020/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). However, many
of the necessary precursor chemicals are legally available in Canada, and so clandestine ecstasy
laboratories in Canada near the United States border have recently become a significant source
of ecstasy consumed in the United States. Id.
65 See Hearings: Underestimating the Threat, supra note 46 (statement of Rand Beers,
Assistant Sec'y of State, Int'l Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Dep't of State).66 Id.
67 Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Donnie Marshall, Adm'r, Drug
Enforcement Admin.). To date, only one ecstasy laboratory has been seized in Colombia. Id.68 Id. It remains to be seen what effect the diversification of and competition within the
ecstasy trade will have on the level of violence associated with ecstasy trafficking.
Traditionally, ecstasy trafficking and use have been associated with a comparatively low level
of violence, with a 1999 survey showing that only 1.9% of convicted ecstasy traffickers
received a sentencing enhancement for weapon involvement, compared to 21.6% for crack
cocaine and 12.2% for drug trafficking in general. See Hearings: America at Risk, supra note
59 (statement of Diana Murphy, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n); see also OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG
CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PULSE CHECK: TRENDs IN DRUG
ABUSE 81 (2001) [hereinafter PULSE CHECK], available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/drugfact/pulsechk/fall2001/faU2001.pdf
(last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
69 Hearings: RA VE Act, supra note 19, at 8 (prepared statement of Andrea Craparotta,
Investigator, Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office, N.J.).
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trafficking patterns can change, but it appears that ecstasy will retain its distinctive
characteristics for some time to come.70
2. Methamphetamine
Methamphetamine is a powerful stimulant, the common side effects of which
include an intense rush of energy and alertness, sleeplessness, paranoia,
hallucinations, and aggressive behavior--sometimes including out-of-control
violent rages.71 Withdrawal from methamphetamine use can bring on feelings of
anxiety, aggression, and paranoia,72 and use of this drug has been shown to create
long-term brain damage similar to Alzheimer's disease, epilepsy, and strokes.73
Production of domestically-consumed methamphetamine takes place mostly
in the western United States and Mexico.74 Because the major precursor chemical
to methamphetamine, pseudophedrine, is commercially produced within the
United States for use in medicines, the primary supply of materials for
methamphetamine production is through the purchase and diversion of this
commercial production. 75 Previously, the production and trafficking of
methamphetamine was controlled by "[i]ndependent laboratory operators,
including outlaw motorcycle gangs," but in recent years, Mexican organized
crime has begun to play an increasingly significant role,76 and importation of
Asian methamphetamine in tablet form has risen significantly.77
70 Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Donnie Marshall, Adm'r, Drug
Enforcement Admin.).
71 OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, ExEcUrIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
METHAMPHETAmiNE (2004), at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
drugfact/methamphetamine/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005); JENNIFER LLOYD,
ExECUTIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ONDCP DRUG POLICY INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE
FACT SHEET: METHAMPHETAMINE 1 (2003) [hereinafter ONDCP: METHAMHETAMINE],
available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/ncj 197534.pdf (last visited
Feb. 25, 2005). Common hallucinations caused by methamphetamine use include "crank bugs,"
or the delusion that bugs are crawling under the user's skin. Users suffering from this delusion
will often develop sores on their body by scratching at the illusory bugs. Id.
72 ONDCP: METHAMPHETAMINE, supra note 71, at 1.
73 News Release, Nat'l Institute on Drug Abuse, Methamphetamine Abuse Linked to
Long-Term Damage to Brain Cells (Mar. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.nida.nih.gov/MedAdv/00/NR3-27.html) (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
74 DEA: DRUG TRAFFICKING, supra note 64.
75 Id. Because methamphetamine production is structured atop the commercial production
of precursor chemicals, this may contribute to a more consistent makeup and quality of
methamphetamine produced, which can have implications on the adverse health effects of
methamphetamine use. See supra note 63.
7 6 DEA: DRUG TRAFFICKING, supra note 64. The relative ease of transporting the drug in
passenger vehicles across the United States-Mexico border has made Mexico a prime location
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3. Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol, or "Roofies') and GHB
Both of these drugs are commonly referred to as "predatory drugs" or "date
rape drugs" because criminals have used them to facilitate rape by unknowingly
slipping the drug into the victim's drink.78 Both drugs tend to sedate and
intoxicate users, making victims less able to resist their attacker, and often induce
short-term memory loss that makes the reporting and prosecution of the crime
more difficult.7 9 Although these drugs have gained notoriety because of their
association with this kind of crime, they are more commonly abused by non-
violent offenders for their euphoric and intoxicating effects.80 When used in
excess, GHB can cause seizures, respiratory depression, and coma.
81
Rohypnol is legally produced in over fifty countries outside the United States,
where it is used as a prescription treatment for insomnia.82 The commercially
produced form of this drug is then smuggled into the United States, particularly
through the Mexican border with California and Texas. 83 GHB is primarily
manufactured and distributed domestically, since the precursor chemical to its
production, GBL, is commercially produced within the United States for use in
industrial cleaners.84
for trafficking through California and Texas. Id.; see also UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG CONTROL: DEA's STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONS IN THE 1990S,
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 20 (1999) [hereinafter DRUG CONTROL: DEA's
STRATEGIES], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99108.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2005).
7 7 DEA: DRUG TRAFFICKING, supra note 64.
78 1d.
79 Id.
80 See id.
811d.
8 2 Id.; OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUtIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CLUB DRUGS (2004) [hereinafter ONDCP: CLUB DRUGS],
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/club/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
83 DEA: DRUG TRAFFICKING, supra note 64.
84 Id. Although some health supplements containing GBL have been removed from the
market, many have been reintroduced under new names containing an alternative precursor, 1,4
butanediol (BD), which is synthesized by the body to create GHB. DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN., CLUB DRUGS: AN UPDATE (2001) [hereinafter DEA: CLUB DRUGS],
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/01026/index.htrnl (last visited Feb. 25, 2005)
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4. Ketamine (Special K)
Like Rohypnol and GHB, Ketamine is a depressant and there are some
reports of it being used as a date rape drug.85 However, it is more commonly
abused for the dissociative, dream-like states of auditory and visual hallucinations
brought on by its use.8 6 Excessive use of Ketamine can cause depression of the
central nervous system, including respiratory depression and heart rate
abnormalities, as well as long-term memory loss and depression. 87
Within the United States, Ketamine is commercially produced and used as a
dissociative general anesthetic by veterinarians and doctors.88 Currently, the only
known source of Ketamine is through the diversion of these pharmacological
products. 89
5. LSD
Use of LSD declined after its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, but began a
substantial rise in the mid-1990s, largely due to its inexpensive price and wide
availability.90 LSD is a powerful hallucinogen, and harmful effects of its use are
generally associated with its mental, rather than physical effects. 91 However, LSD
is not a physically addicting drug, so most users voluntarily reduce or stop its use
over time.92
Production of domestic LSD takes place almost exclusively in the western
United States, particularly in San Francisco and Northern California. 93 The
production and trafficking organizations of LSD are highly developed and
generally continue to elude drug enforcement pursuit.94 Over time, these
organizations have developed a mail-order system of distribution that hides the
85 DEA: CLUB DRUGS, supra note 84; ONDCP: CLUB DRUGS, supra note 82.
86 ONDCP: CLUB DRUGS, supra note 82.
87 Id.; DEA: CLUB DRUGS, supra note 84.
88 DEA: CLUB DRUGS, supra note 84.
89 Id.
9 0 See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., HALLUCINOGENS, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concem/hallucinogens.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
91 See id.
9 2 Id. Conversely, LSD does have a tolerance effect, such that habitual users must use
increasingly large doses in order to obtain the same effect. Id.
93 DEA: DRUG TRAFFICKING, supra note 64.
94 Id. To date, only four LSD laboratories have been seized by the DEA. News Release,
Drug Enforcement Admin., Pickard and Apperson Sentenced On LSD Charges: Largest LSD
Lab Seizure In DEA History (Nov. 25, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/sanfranl 12403.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
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identity.,cf buyers and sellers, giving each level of the organization increasing
insulation from enforcement efforts.95 User-end distribution of LSD is thought to
focus on rock concerts, although its distribution and use have been increasingly
linked to the rave scene. 96
C. What it Means, and Does Not Mean, To Be a Club Drug
Looking at this cross-section of substances commonly grouped under the
label "club drugs," several observations are notable. First, these drugs differ
widely in their subjective effects and in their adverse health consequences.
Included in this makeshift group are stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, and
combinations thereof, with effects ranging from empathy to aggression and from
depression to psychosis. Some pose the threat of acute physical harm to the user,
others create the possibility of mental harm to the user, and still others are used to
commit crimes against third parties. Even among the possible physical harms, the
drugs vary widely: from hyperthermia to coma, and from short-term memory loss
to long-term neurological damage. Such differences suggest that individual
strategies in education and health management would be more effective than a
collective program targeting an artificial grouping of drugs.
Second, the places and methods of production of these drugs are equally
varied. Some drugs are manufactured legally within the United States and
diverted for illegal use, while others are illegally manufactured from domestically
legal precursor chemicals. Other drugs are illegally manufactured from illegal
precursor chemicals, while still others are manufactured abroad and smuggled
into the United States for distribution. Again, these differences suggest that an
effective drug policy should be tailored to the specific nature of each drug.
Finally, the manner in which the drugs are trafficked into and distributed
within the United States varies significantly. Geographically, these drugs vary
when entering the United States, some making extensive use of the United States-
Mexico border, others focusing on east-coast port cities, and still others being
produced and distributed domestically. Furthermore, although major crime
organizations are involved with all of these drugs to some degree, there is a
notable distinction among the major traffickers, as between European, Asian,
Mexican, Colombian, and domestic criminal organizations.97 Obviously, an
95 DEA: DRUG TRAFFICKING, supra note 64.
9 6 
Id.
9 7 As previously noted, the future of this distinction for ecstasy is uncertain, as Colombian
and Mexican drug traffickers become more involved. At present, however, it seems likely that
Russian and Israeli organizations will continue to control the ecstasy trade. See supra note 68
and accompanying text.
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effective program to address the abuse of these drugs must take these differences
into account as well.
In light of these three observations, the limited nature of the similarities
among this artificial grouping of substances is apparent. As the title "club drugs"
itself discloses, all that these substances seem to have in common is that they are
frequently used in the settings of nightclubs and raves. But does this association
hold up under current evidence? And whether or not it does, can it justify the
particular legislative and executive attempts that have been made to address drug
use in these settings?
Both anecdotal and statistical findings show that many attendees of
nightclubs and raves use one or more of these club drugs during an event, often
combining several drugs at once.98 But whereas the use of these drugs was
previously believed to be relatively confined to these events, their use has now
expanded beyond the rave scene and into mainstream culture.99 Testifying before
the Senate Judiciary Caucus on Intemational Narcotics Control, the Deputy
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy stated that "[u]se of the
drug is often associated with the underground 'Rave' youth subculture, but in
truth is a problem anywhere young people congregate. Drug marketers don't
target a place; they target kids."'100 Geographically, use of these drugs has spread
out from large cities to rural areas, 101 and culturally, it has spread beyond the rave
scene to African-American and Hispanic youth. 102 So while it is true that drug
use at nightclubs and raves continues to be common, the dispersion and
diversification of the use of club drugs undermines the assumptions behind the
notion of treating these substances as a group, as well as the overall efficacy of
any enforcement program targeted at drug use only in these settings. 10 3
9 8 See Hearings: Underestimating the Threat, supra note 46 (statement of Richard A.
Fiano, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Admin.); Hearings: America at Risk, supra note
59 (statement of Donnie Marshall, Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.).
99 Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Donald R. Vereen, Jr., Deputy
Dir., Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy) ("Use is no longer confined to the rave scene: the sale
and use of club drugs has expanded from nightclubs and raves to high schools, the streets,
neighborhoods, and open venues."); see also PULSE CHECK, supra note 68, at 82, 84.
100 Hearings: Underestimating the Threat, supra note 46 (statement of Donald R. Vereen,
Jr., Deputy Dir., Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy).
101 Id.
102 Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Donald R. Vereen, Jr., Deputy
Dir., Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy).
103 In other words the parallel rise in ecstasy use and raves in Europe is relatively well
established; but because ecstasy and other club drugs have moved beyond this limited venue, a
reduction in raves is not likely to have a parallel reduction in club drug abuse. See DEA:
RAvEs, supra note 48; PULSE CHECK, supra note 68, at 82.
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However, in the past three years there have been a number of legislative acts
(both passed and proposed) and executive enforcement measures targeting the
activity of rave promoters and attendees. These actions have raised substantial
public concern because of the perception that the government is not trying to
target individual drug dealers and users at raves and nightclubs, but is instead
simply trying to shut down raves as venues for possible drug use by holding their
owners and promoters liable for the drug activity of attendees. 10 4 The remaining
question, therefore, is whether this public concern is warranted, or whether these
measures are justified as a legitimate and effective method of addressing the
abuse of these drugs. But before considering this question in detail, it is important
to outline the particular policies and actions that have given rise to this concern.
111. ExEcuTIVE PoLIcIES EXPANDING LIABILITY BEYOND DIRECT
INVOLVEMENT N DRUG ACTIvITY
As the problem of drug abuse at nightclubs and raves became more
widespread and gained notoriety, law enforcement across the country began to
respond. However, traditional efforts to address drug use in these settings proved
to be less effective than in previous settings, due in part to the notably young age
of many drug users and sellers at these events. 105 Law enforcement policy often
prohibits the use of juveniles as informants, and where it does not, parents are
often unwilling to let their children participate for fear of their safety-
undermining the ability of law enforcement officers to uncover the identity of
drug dealers. 106 Furthermore, the young age of buyers and sellers of club drugs
means that "[a]dult officers most likely cannot purchase, nor infiltrate the
organizations responsible for the distribution of these substances."' 0 7 Faced with
this difficulty in confronting a continually rising problem from the user-end up, 10 8
104 See, e.g., Montgomery, supra note 43.
105 See Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Steven Rust, Sergeant,
Milford, Del. Police Dep't). As of 1999, use of ecstasy was highest among 18 to 25 year-olds,
with 8% of teenagers reporting to have used the drug in their lifetime. Hearings:
Underestimating the Threat, supra note 46 (statement of Donald R. Vereen, Jr., Deputy Dir.,
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy). Furthermore, ecstasy traffickers tend to be much younger
than traffickers of other drugs, with "[o]ver one-third of the federal offenders sentenced for
ecstasy trafficking in fiscal year 2000 [falling] between the ages of 21 and 25 years old."
Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Diana Murphy, Judge, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n).
106 See Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Steven Rust, Sergeant,
Milford, Del. Police Dep't).
107 Id.; see Clements, supra note 23.
108 Testimony from the Director of Florida's Office of Drug Control suggests that
traditional supply-end reduction tactics remain effective in addressing the abuse of these drugs.
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law enforcement agencies began to adapt their existing arsenal of laws and tactics
for use in this new environment. 10 9 Rather than limit liability to those directly
involved in drug activity, they began to take action against rave promoters,
attendees, and raves in general.
A. State and Local Enforcement Initiatives Targeting Rave Activity
One of the steps taken by local law enforcement agencies has been to try to
shut down raves by strictly and broadly enforcing "juvenile curfews, fire codes,
health and safety ordinances, liquor laws, and licensing requirements for large
public gatherings." ' 1 0 Although this kind of approach has been successful in
reducing rave activity, the degree to which this actually decreases drug usage or
simply moves it to new areas is unclear.I I
Apart from preventing raves from occurring, another method has been to
directly charge the promoters, attendees, or performers at raves under city
ordinances. The most infamous example of this approach occurred in November
of 2001, where police officers in Racine, Wisconsin issued fines of $968 to over
440 attendees of a local fundraiser featuring electronic music." 2 In that case, the
Florida's policy, combining heightened sentencing for drug trafficking with increased efforts to
seize drugs as they enter the country, has been effective in reducing the supply of drugs and has
lowered drug use among teenagers. See Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of
Jim McDonough, Dir., Fla. Office of Drug Control).
109 See INFORMATION BULLETIN: RAVES, supra note 50, at 5.
110 Id. This approach has been pursued with particular vigor in New York and San
Francisco, where many rave and nightclub owners have had their liquor licenses revoked. See
Janelle Brown, Your Glow Stick Could Land You in Jail, Apr. 16, 2003, at
http://archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2003/04/16/rave/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). In response,
a political action group called the San Francisco Late Night Coalition (http://www.sflnc.org/)
has formed to preserve the city's night life. Id. Similarly, South Carolina and Hartford,
Connecticut have used health codes and nuisance suits to shut down rave activity. See
Hearings: Looking the Other Way, supra note 11 (testimony of Asa Hutchinson, Adm'r, Drug
Enforcement Admin.).
I INFORMATION BULLIN: RAVES, supra note 50, at 5. In some situations, moving raves
outside the reach of these ordinances may mean that alternative venues, such as abandoned
warehouses or open fields, will not have facilities such as running water and air conditioning, or
close proximity to health care facilities that reduce the adverse health effects of drug use. See
supra Part V.B. 1; Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 24 (prepared statement of Graham
Boyd, Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU).
112 See Tom Kertscher, Rave-Goers Achieve Victory in Racine, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Jan. 17, 2003, at Al, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/racine/jan03/111280.asp (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005); Drug Policy Alliance, After ACLU Action, Police Dismiss Citations
Against Hundreds of Electronic Music Concertgoers in Wisconsin, Jan. 16, 2003, at
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Uptown Theater Group, Inc. held a benefit event in a local bar to raise money to
restore "an historic landmark theater." 1 3 Undercover officers at the event called
the police after seeing some evidence of drug activity, and uniformed officers
subsequently arrived and ticketed virtually everyone at the event.11 4
Despite the fact that there were only three arrests made for drug possession,
over 440 attendees were charged with violating the city's "disorderly house"
ordinance, which made it unlawful to "knowingly" patronize a place "which is
used for the purpose of unlawfully selling, serving, storing, keeping or giving
away controlled substances."1 15 It is unclear in what manner all of these attendees
were purported to have this knowledge-from their personal interaction with the
three arrested drug dealers or merely from the kind of music being played and the
clothes being wom. Ultimately, all of these charges were dropped, 116 but the
incident quickly gained notoriety as a clear signal of the emerging law
enforcement mentality toward raves and electronic music events.1 17
B. Federal Law Enforcement Actions under 21 US.C. § 856
In a move paralleling state and local authorities, federal law enforcement
agencies have also adapted existing laws to address the problem of drug abuse at
http://www.aclu.org/DrugPolicy/DrugPolicy.cfm?D=11628&c=185 (last visited Feb. 25,
200513 Drug Policy Alliance, supra note 112.
114 See Kertscher, supra note 112.
115 Racine Mun. Code § 66-346 (2002), available at
http://www.municode.com/resources/codelist.asp?statelD=49 (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). This
ordinance was repealed and recreated in 2003. For excerpts from the original text, see Letter
from Graham Boyd, ACLU Drug Policy Litig. Project & Mike Diaz, ACLU of Wis., to Wright,
Racine City Attorney (Nov. 25, 2002),
http://www.aclu.org/DrugPolicy/DrugPolicy.cfin?ID=11661&c=185 (last visited Feb. 25,
2005).116 See Kertscher, supra note 112. In response to the unsurprising protests of the charged
attendees, the assistant city attorney attempted to "defuse" the situation by reducing the fine to
$100 and by later removing any reference to drugs in the citations. Id. But most of the accused
refused to enter into plea agreements and demanded a trial, and the ACLU threatened a class
action suit if the charges were pursued. Although the city finally dropped the charges to prevent
any such suits, city officials still believed the incident helped deter parties with illegal drug use.
Id. 117 Id. In a surprising move, the Racine City Council repealed and recreated their
disorderly house ordinance on February 19, 2003, making it directly applicable to raves and
entertainment events. The new ordinance no longer requires that a place be used "for the
purpose" of drug activity, but only that it be a place which is "not generally open to the public
in which there is substantial evidence of" drug activity. See Racine Mun. Code § 66-346; see
also Minutes of Racine City Council Chamber, Feb. 19, 2003, at 7,
http://www.cityofracine.org/CityGov/commoncouncil/2003/COUNCIL_MINUTES_03-02-
19.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
raves and nightclubs. Primarily, this has been done through 21 U.S.C. § 856, also
known as the crack house law. 118 As originally enacted and applied, this law
made it unlawftl to:
(1) knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing,
distributing, or using any controlled substance;
(2) manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner,
lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent,
lease, or make available for use, with or without compensation, the building,
room, or enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing,
distributing, or using a controlled substance.119
The Department of Justice identified a five-step process to help law
enforcement officers apply this law effectively, the first step of which is to
"[i]dentify rave promoters."' 120 According to this suggested process, "[p]otential
subjects for investigation included all parties responsible for managing the
production and promotion of the raves, including the owners of the property
where the event was held."'121 Second, records from emergency medical services
showing transportation of rave attendees to emergency rooms should be
compiled.122 Third, undercover officers should conduct operations during an
event and attempt to film the prevalence of drug use, the actions of security
personnel, the purchase of drug paraphernalia, and "ravers using drugs and using
the paraphernalia to enhance or manage the effects of the drugs."'123 Fourth,
undercover agents should apply for security positions and document the
promoter's expectations on enforcement of drug laws. 124 Finally, law
enforcement should execute search warrants at the homes of rave promoters and
attempt to find any items relating to their promotion of raves, including
advertisements, purchase orders for "rave paraphernalia, water, and other stock,"
and documents detailing the responsibilities of security personnel.125
In theory, guidelines such as these may help establish the direct responsibility
of a promoter for facilitating the use of drugs-particularly evidence as to the
promoter's expectations on the enforcement of drug laws. But in practice, as
118 This law was recently amended by the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act, but the
government's attempt to use this law to target rave activity predates these amendments. See Part
1V.B.
119 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2000).
120 See INFORMATION BuLLETIN: RAvES, supra note 50, at 5.
121 Id. at 5-6.
122 Id. at 6.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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applied by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), they may actually do
little to distinguish criminal promoters, who are intentionally profiting off drug
use at their events, from legitimate promoters, who are simply nmning an event
where it is likely that drug abuse will occur despite their precautions. As evidence
of how this law may be used to target legitimate business owners and ultimately
hold them liable for the drug use of" their patrons, critics cite the events
surrounding the State Palace Theater in New Orleans. 126
The State Palace Theater is host to a large number of electronic music events,
and even though it had instituted a zero-tolerance policy toward drug use, the
owner and promoter were both charged under 21 U.S.C. § 856.127 This policy
included offering a free ticket to anyone who turned in a person with drugs,
instructing security guards to refuse admission to intoxicated individuals,
detaining drug users and arranging for their arrest, 128 and facilitating the arrest of
many drug sellers-including security guards employed by the State Palace
Theater. 129 Furthermore, the owner had specifically invited undercover DEA
officers into events, allowed them to pose as security officers, and even helped to
disguise them as "ravers. ' '130 However, after conducting an extensive undercover
investigation of the State Palace Theater, 131 the DEA decided not to pursue any
12 6 See, e.g., Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 21-23 (prepared statement of
Graham Boyd, Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU). In contrast, proponents of the Illicit
Drug Anti Proliferation Act cite this case as an example of the shortcomings of this statute,
calling for the law to be more narrowly tailored to a rave setting. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC.
S1678 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden).
12 7 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 21-23 (prepared statement of Graham
Boyd, Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU); see also United States v. Brunet, No. 01 -CR-10
(E.D. La. Jan. 12,2001).
12 8 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 22 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU). Ironically, in a number of instances, the police or DEA
ignored such notifications of detainees, and the theater had to destroy the drugs and release the
individuals. Id.; see also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants
James Estopinal and Brian Brunet's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment at 7-8, Brunet (No. 01-
CR- 10) [hereinafter Brunet Motion to Dismiss], available at
http://www.emdef.org/pdf/bnnet.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,2005).
129 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 22 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project ACLU). On multiple occasions, the theater had also requested
the assistance of the New Orleans Police Department to prevent drug use during raves, but each
of these requests was denied. Id.; see also Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 7-8.
130 Bnnet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 7.
131 See McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2003). This investigation lasted
from 1999 until the DEA raided the State Palace Theater in August 2000. During this time, the
DEA made fifty purchases of controlled substances. Furthermore, the investigation showed that
in the period from December 1997 to March 2000, over seventy attendees were sent to a
hospital for drug overdoses, and one seventeen year-old had died. Id.
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charges against any drug users or sellers, but instead arrested the proprietors,
Robert and Brian Brunet, and the promoter, James Estopinal, under the crack
house law. 132 These charges were later dismissed, but the government also
brought suit against the company managing the State Palace Theater, Barbeque of
New Orleans, Inc. (Barbeque), for conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). 133
This case was settled by a plea agreement that required Barbeque, the Brunets,
and other associated businesses to take a number of measures to restrict the
admission, use, or sale of items regarded as drug paraphemalia. 134 Included
among these items are "pacifier[s], objects that glow... vapor rub
products ... [and] masks of any description."1 35 In addition to this, the parties to
the plea agreement may not provide "masseurs, massage tables, or 'chill rooms'
(kept 15 degrees cooler than the rest of the building)," and must contact the police
if they or any employees witness the use or sale of drugs. 136
At no point in the proceedings did the government allege that the owners or
promoters of this establishment either encouraged or condoned drug use, much
less that they were directly involved in using or selling controlled substances. 137
To the contrary, it is difficult to imagine what more they could have done to
prevent or deter drug use during their events, apart from shutting them down
completely.
But this was not an isolated incident. Almost simultaneously with this case,
the DEA was pursuing similar charges against the owners and promoters of Club
La Vela in Panama City Beach, Florida. 138 Again, police conducted a lengthy,
132 See McClure v. Ashcroft, No. 01-CV-2573-T, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2532, at *3
(E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2002); Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 21-23 (prepared statement of
Graham Boyd, Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU).
133 United States v. Barbeque of New Orleans, Inc., No. 01-CR-153 (E.D. La. Aug. 23,
2001), available at http://www.emdef.org/pdf/NOLAFactualBasis.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2005). Robert and Brian Brunet are corporate officers of Barbeque. See McClure, 335 F.3d at
406.
134 McClure, 335 F.3d at 406.
13 5 Id. This part of the plea agreement was initially struck down as violating the right to
free speech, after a group of artists who use the prohibited items in their performances brought a
third-party challenge to the plea agreement. The district court enjoined enforcement of this
provision because it found that the state could not force persons, via a plea agreement, to refrain
from using lawful items in artistic, expressive communication. McClure, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2532, at * 17. However, this decision was vacated when the court of appeals decided
that in a civil suit, a third party challenge to a criminal plea agreement is nonjusticiable.
McClure, 335 F.3d at 414.
136 McClure, 335 F.3d at 406-07.
137 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 22 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU).
138 The DEA raided the State Palace Theater in August 2000, McClure, 335 F.3d at 406,
and raided Club La Vela in April 2000, Clements, supra note 23.
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expensive investigation of the premises, and having failed to find any evidence of
the owners or promoters being directly involved in drug activity, they
nevertheless arrested them and charged them under the crack house law. 139 While
authorities also arrested a number of drug users and sellers in the course of this
investigation, they decided to forego prosecuting them so that they would testify
against the owners and promoters. 140 In the end, the jury needed only seventy-
five minutes to acquit the defendants of all charges. 141
On the surface, it appears that in both these instances the DEA followed the
five-step procedure suggested by the Department of Justice. 142 But unfortunately,
despite the fact that the DEA did not find any evidence that the owners and
promoters of the State Palace Theater or Club La Vela were involved with drug
activity, 143 they were not deterred from bringing charges in either case. It is in
response to incidents such as these in New Orleans, Panama City Beach, and
Racine that concerned organizations 144 have mobilized to help ensure that federal,
state, and local authorities continue to enforce laws responsibly, and to discuss the
extent to which this form of secondary liability should be pursued as a solution to
the abuse of club drugs. 145
13 9 See Mike Cazalas, Bay Watch: Sun Still Rises Over La Vela, NEWS HERALD (Panama
City Beach, Fla.), Dec. 1, 2001, at B2. Club La Vela also had a zero-tolerance policy for drug
use, and was actually criticized for how often they called the police to pick up drug offenders.
Defendants Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Facial Unconstitutionality with Incorporated
Memorandum of Law at 6-7 & n.1, United States v. Pfeffer, (N.D. Fla. 2001) (No. 5-01-CR-
07-RH) [hereinafter Pfeffer Motion to Dismiss], available at
http://www.emdef.org/clublavela/070001 LaVela m dismiss.pdf(last visited Feb. 25, 2005)
14 0 See Cazalas, supra note 139. The owners of Club La Vela argue that the $30 million
forfeiture of the club-one of the largest clubs in the nation-was a motivating factor in
bringing the charges. Pfeffer Motion to Dismiss, supra note 139, at 23.
141 See Angier, supra note 26.
142 See INFORMATION BULLETIN: RAVES, supra note 50, at 5-6.
143 See Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 8; Pfeffer Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 139, at 8.
144 The ACLU has a special group called the Drug Policy Alliance
(http://www.drugpolicy.org/) for issues of drug control policies, and also helped to set up the
Electronic Music Defense & Education Fund (http://www.emdef.org/) in response to the State
Palace Theater case. Also, the Ravers Against Opposition to Raves (ROAR) has coordinated
protests in Washington, D.C. over the RAVE Act. See Ravers Against Opposition to Raves
(ROAR), TalkLeft, Sept. 18, 2003, at http://talkleft.com/newarchives/003749.html (last visited
Feb. 25,2005).
145 Ironically, the federal government has recently found itself on the receiving end of this
same theory of liability. The family members of five persons killed in a car accident after
attending a rave held on government lands and under a permit issued by the U.S. Forest Service
have sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Forest Service for wrongful death.
See Ben Goad, Government Sued In Post-Rave Deaths: Legislation: The Filing of the
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL AcTS EXPANDING LIABILITY BEYOND DIRECT
INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG ACTIvITY
Since 2001, four bills have been introduced in Congress to address the
problem of drug abuse at raves and nightclubs. 146 What makes these bills
unique-and, consequently, what has drawn much public criticism--is that they
do not target individual drug users or traditional drug dealing activity at raves, but
are aimed at the owners and promoters of raves and nightclubs. 147 Whereas
existing laws criminalize the direct sale or possession of controlled substances
(regardless of the location or identity of the user or seller), 148 these bills generally
seek to extend criminal and civil liability to owners and promoters of raves and
nightclubs for their responsibility in facilitating the sale of controlled substances.
A. The Ecstasy Prevention Act
As the first bill to confront the problem of drug abuse at raves, the Ecstasy
Prevention Act 149 was a rather indirect, but candid attempt to shut down raves in
general. This bill gave financial incentives to local communities to prevent raves
from occurring by granting priority in awarding federal public health awards to
"communities that have taken measures to combat club drug use."'150 According
to the statute, such measures include "passing ordinances restricting rave
clubs.., and seizing lands under nuisance abatement laws to make new
restrictions on an establishment's use." 151 This would mean essentially re-zoning
a seized location to forbid raves.
Complaint Coincides with Protests Against a New Anti-Drug Law, THE PRESS ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, Cal.), May 31, 2003, at Al, LEXIS, News & Business, Press Enterprise File.
Toxicology reports showed that all five individuals had used controlled substances. Id.
According to the family members, the government should have known the dangers of allowing
a rave to be held on its property, and is therefore liable for the harms that result from those
foreseeable dangers. Id. However, the toxicology reports also showed that the driver was not
intoxicated at the time of the crash and merely lost control of his vehicle on a dangerous
mountain road. Id. The promoter of the event, Brett Ballou, has also been sued for $35 million
by the families. Pelisek, supra note 12. In a similar case, the family of the victim of an ecstasy
overdose has sued the Circus Disco & Arena in Hollywood, alleging that it is liable for
wrongful death because it failed to control drug activity on its property. Id.
146 Ecstasy Prevention Act of 2001, H.R. 2582, 107th Cong. (2001); RAVE Act, S. 2633,
107th Cong. (2002); CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act, H.R. 834, 108th Cong. (2003);
Ecstasy Awareness Act of 2003, H.R. 2962, 108th Cong. (2003).
147 See, e.g., Montgomery, supra note 43.
148 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000).
149 H.R. 2582; S. 1208, 107th Cong. (2001).
150 H.R. 2582 § 3.
151 Id.
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Although the Ecstasy Prevention Act was introduced in both houses of
Congress and was added as a rider to a Justice Department Appropriations bill, it
was never passed. 15 2 At the time, the bill drew some criticism for "profiling"
raves and electronic music rather than directly addressing drug usage,153 but
because the bill has not been reintroduced following its death, public concern over
its implications has been relatively quiet, and the focus has shifted to the
following three acts.
B. The RA VE Act (or the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act)
On June 18, 2002, Senator Biden introduced a bill known as the RAVE
Act154 which has since become the center of a flurry of harsh criticism by rave
promoters and nightclub owners, as well as fans of electronic music and the rave
scene. 155 Although the bill is a rather technical amendment to the existing crack
house law,156 what seems to have incited substantial public opposition to this bill
(and its future incarnations) was its rather inflammatory title and a set of
"findings" included in the bill that accused raves of being "little more than a way
to exploit American youth."'1 57 In addition, these "findings" concluded that "[t]he
trafficking and use of 'club drugs' ... is deeply embedded in the rave culture"'158
and accused rave promoters of intentionally profiting off drug use by selling
bottled water and various lexicons of the rave subculture such as glow sticks,
massage oils, and pacifiers.159
In response to the surprisingly effective public awareness actions of civil
liberties groups and electronic music organizations, neither the Senate bill nor the
152 See 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, H.R. 2215,
107th Cong. §§ 8001-07 (2001). This portion of the Justice Department Appropriations bill
was removed in conference committee proceedings. 148 CONG. REc. S9699-700 (daily ed. Oct.
1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Graham).
153 See, e.g., Tam Ramroop, Groups Criticize Ecstasy Bill in US. Senate, UNIVERsrrY
WIRE, Jan. 25, 2002, at C1.
154 RAVE Act, S. 2633, 107th Cong. (2002).
155 See, e.g., Montgomery, supra note 43.
156 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2000).
157 S. 2633 § 2(5); see Brown, supra note 110.
158 S. 2633 § 2(3).
159 Id. § 2(6)-(7). These "findings" link all of these items to aspects of drug use, but
ignore their practical value or their role as a means of socially identifying oneself with a
particular subculture. See supra note 50. As Senator Biden later recognized when removing the
"findings" section, there are legitimate reasons for these actions, and they should not be used as
factors in determining legal culpability. 149 CONG. REc. S1678 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Biden).
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identical House bill160 made it to a floor vote before the congressional session
ended.161 However, opponents of the bill could hardly breathe a sigh of relief
before the bill was resurrected in the following session, this time sporting a new
(much less catchy) name-The Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003
(IDAPA)-and shedding its controversial "findings" section. 162 This time, to
circumvent the rising public opposition, Senator Biden attached his bill to the
popular PROTECT Act163 while it was in conference committee. 164 Under the
sheltering wings of the PROTECT Act, Biden's bill sailed through Congress with
only a whisper of recognition or opposition.165
Throughout the legislative history of this bill, the operative portions remained
the same. Primarily, these consist of three alterations to the crack house law. First,
that statute previously made it illegal to "knowingly open or maintain any place
for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled
substance."' 166 Under the new law, coverage will include those who "open, lease,
rent, use, or maintain any place, whether permanently or temporarily" for the
restricted purpose. 167 The purpose of adding the "permanently or temporarily"
language was apparently to help clarify that the law is intended "to apply not just
to ongoing drug distribution operations, but to single-event activities, such as a
party where the promoter sponsors the event with the purpose of distributing
Ecstasy or other illegal drugs."'168
Second, the IDAPA replaced a former subsection of the crack house law that
made it illegal to
160 RAVE Act, H.R. 5519, 107th Cong. (2002).
161 See Brown, supra note 110.
162 S. 226, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill was reintroduced in the House under its former
title, but the House version also removed the "findings" section. See RAVE Act of 2003,
H.R. 718, 108th Cong. (2003).
163 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 [PROTECT Act], Pub. L. No. 108-2 1, § 608, 117 Stat. 650, 691 (2003). This bill is
also known as the "Amber Alert" bill, and generally addresses the sexual exploitation of
children. Id.
164 See Brown, supra note 110.
165 Although a few members of Congress did indicate some reservations about the
addition, these were far too sparse to have any effect on the passage of the bill. See 149 CONG.
REC. S5334 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Bingaman); 149 CONG. REc. S5147-
48 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 149 CONG. REc. H3072-73 (daily ed.
Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Rep. Kilpatrick). Even members who specifically came out against
the addition of the IDAPA still voted for the PROTECT Act. See Bracelin, supra note 13.
166 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2000).
167 PROTECT Act § 608(b)(1)(A).
168 148 CONG. REC. S10,218 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden).
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manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner, lessee,
agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, or
make available for use, with or without compensation, the building, room, or
enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or
using a controlled substance. 169
Under Senator Biden's new bill, that section is replaced with one that makes it
unlawful to
manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either as an
owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly and
intentionally rent, lease, profit frorn, or make available for use, with or without
compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing,
distributing, or using a controlled substance. 170
Again, the "permanently or temporarily" language is intended to make the
law encompass one-time events as well as on-going drug activity. 171 In addition
to this, the substitution of "place" for "building, room, or enclosure" was intended
to make the law apply to "outdoor as well as indoor venues."' 172 While these two
changes appear rather technical, opponents found them nonetheless objectionable
as a symbolic message that-just as Congress was turning its legislative eyes
toward the rave scene--drug enforcement agencies would likely use this law in a
discriminatory manner against the electronic music community. 173
The third change to the crack house law adds a new section creating civil
penalties for violations of either of the above sections. 174 This change means that
owners and promoters may be found guilty of violations by a preponderance of
the evidence standard instead of beyond a reasonable doubt, and that accused
parties may not have the right to a trial by jury. And in addition to this, the
penalties imposed are substantial: civil liabilities can be up to the greater of
$250,000 or two times the gross receipts from the offender's violation. 175
169 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
170 PROTECT Act § 608(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
171 148 CONG. REc. S10,218 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden).
172 Id. Raves are often held in open fields, and thus otherwise liable promoters might
avoid liability under the Act as previously written. See id.; Hearings: Looking the Other Way,
supra note 11 (statement of Asa Hutchinson, Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.).
173 See Brown, supra note 110. While the crack house law had previously been applied to
several owners and promoters of raves and nightclubs, the changes made to this statute under
the IDAPA were specifically intended to tailor the statute to be more easily and effectively
applied in this new context. See 149 CONG. REc. S1679 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Biden).
174 PROTECT Act § 608(c).
175 Id.
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The remaining parts of the crack house law remained intact. These sections
impose severe criminal penalties: up to twenty years in prison, up to a $500,000
fine for individuals, and up to a $2,000,000 fine for corporations.' 7 6 Furthermore,
persons convicted under the crack house law forfeit the property used in
commission of the crime to the government. 177
C. The CLEAN- UP of Methamphetamines Act
While the IDAPA has received most of the media attention on the subject of
rave legislation,178 the CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act179 is a much more
direct and overt attempt to hold promoters and owners of entertainment events
liable for the drug use of their attendees. The considerable force and relative
simplicity of this Act is apparent from its text:
Whoever, for a commercial purpose, knowingly promotes any rave, dance,
music, or other entertainment event, that takes place under circumstances where
the promoter knows or reasonably ought to know that a controlled substance will
be used or distributed in violation of Federal law or the law of the place where
the event is held, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned
for not more than 9 years, or both. 180
Given the obvious fact that most entertainment promoters do not work pro
bono, but seek to make a profit on their events, the only operative element of this
Act is the promoter's knowledge-or constructive knowledge-that attendees are
using drugs at an event. Considering the vagueness of this standard and its
sweeping implications for the entertainment industry, as well as the substantial
sentence imposed, it is surprising that this Act has not received more public
criticism. However, these possible impacts may explain its inability to come to a
floor vote in either house of Congress on three separate occasions. 181
176 21 U.S.C. § 856(b) (2000).
177 See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2000); see also 21 U.S.C. § 856(e) (2000).
178 Although this may be in part due to the catchier name of this bill's predecessor, it is
also likely that there is some confusion in the media among these bills. Senator Biden has
repeatedly implied that opponents of his bill are mistaking it for either the CLEAN-UP of
Methamphetamines Act or the Ecstasy Awareness Act. See, e.g., 149 CoNG. REc. S10,607
(daily ed. July 31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden); 149 CoNG. REc. S5153 (daily ed. Apr. 10,
2003) (statement of Sen. Biden).
179 CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act, H.R. 3782, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 2763,
107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 834, 108th Cong. (2003).
180 H.R. 834 § 305(a). This provision would be added as a subsection of the existing crack
house law (21 U.S.C. § 856). Id.
181 See H.R. 3782; S. 2763; H.R. 834.
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D. The Ecstasy Awareness Act
Like the CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act, the Ecstasy Awareness
Act182 directly targets promoters for the drug use of attendees. However, this
bill-introduced for the first time in July of 2003183-is even more
discriminatory in that it specifically targets the electronic music community for
selective treatment, and is even more draconian in its sentencing provision:
Whoever profits monetarily from a rave or similar electronic dance event,
knowing or having reason to know that the unlawful use or distribution of a
controlled substance occurs at the rave or similar event, shall be fined not more
than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the defendant is
an organization, the fine imposable for the offense is not more than
$2,000,000.184
Again, the only operative element of this Act is that the owner has actual or
constructive knowledge of drug use at an event. The price of this knowledge is a
sentence of up to twenty years in jail and fines up to two million dollars. Perhaps
surprisingly, this bill has yet to receive widespread recognition or opposition,
although public concerns addressed to the RAVE Act may often be intentionally
or mistakenly referencing this bill by association. 
1 85
E. A Comparison of Bills Expanding Responsibility for Drug Activity
The key distinction between these bills is the degree to which they depart
from the traditional notion of liability for direct involvement in drug activity. By
comparison to existing laws, the IDAPA made only a small expansion in liability,
by broadening its scope from on-going operations to include one-time events.
186
But because of the way the crack house law has been interpreted by the courts, it
may actually create liability for landowners who merely know that drug activity is
taking place.' 87 To this extent, it is a more substantial step away from direct
liability. However, the CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act and the Ecstasy
182 Ecstasy Awareness Act of 2003, H.R. 2962, 108th Cong. (2003).
183 Id.
184 Id. § 2. Like the CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act and the IDAPA, this Act
would add a new subsection to the existing crack house law (21 U.S.C. § 856). Id.
185 See supra note 178. Senator Biden, the author and sponsor of the RAVE Act and of its
successor, the IDAPA, has argued as much. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REc. S10,607 (daily ed. July
31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden); 149 CONG. REc. S5153 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Biden).
186 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
187 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Awareness Act both move significantly farther away from the notion of direct
liability, by holding owners and promoters liable when they should have known
that drug use was occurring. Finally, the Ecstasy Prevention Act takes the greatest
leap away from direct liability. By seeking to ban raves as a measure to combat
drug use, it holds the entire rave subculture responsible for the illegal activity of
individuals.
The other significant way in which these bills differ is in terms of their scope:
what kinds of buildings or events come within their reach? The Ecstasy
Prevention Act and the Ecstasy Awareness Act are both addressed exclusively to
raves. The CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act expands on this slightly to
cover any entertainment event. And the IDAPA (and the pre-existing crack house
law) are written neutrally, to apply to "any place" in which the prohibited activity
happens to occur.
While proponents of these bills will often correctly distinguish them from one
another in these respects, 88 they share several characteristics that have unified
them in the minds of many opponents. 189 The first and most important aspect of
these four bills is that they disclose a new strategy in addressing the problem of
club drugs. 190 Rather than using the traditional method of directly prohibiting the
use or sale of drugs, all of these bills-to differing degrees-seek to hold raves or
their owners and promoters responsible for the role they play in facilitating the
use of drugs. While the Ecstasy Prevention Act does this by encouraging local
communities to simply outlaw raves, 191 the other three Acts would hold
promoters and owners of raves and nightclubs personally liable for permitting or
encouraging drug use at their events. 192
188 See, e.g., 149 Cong. Rec. S10,607 (daily ed. July 31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(contrasting the scienter requirements of the IDAPA with the CLEAN-UP of
Methamphetamines Act).
189 See, e.g., ELECTRONIC Music DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, LAws, LEGISLATION,
LEGAL CASES, at http://www.emdef org/laws and cases.hml (last visited Feb. 25, 2005)
(discussing the four Acts together in the context of legislation affecting the electronic music
community).
190 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000) (creating direct liability for selling controlled
substances). Although the version of the crack house law pre-dating the IDAPA had been
applied to several owners and promoters of raves and nightclubs, this was only a very recent
phenomenon. See supra Part Ill.B. Furthermore, the changes made to this statute under the
IDAPA were purportedly intended to address some possible shortcomings of applying the
statute in this new context. See 149 CONG. REC. S1679 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Biden) (noting that application of the original crack house law in the context of rave
promoters and owners had met with "mixed results," and that the RAVE Act was intended to
make this law more applicable to the rave environment).
191 See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
192 While Senator Biden has been at pains to point out the different standard of liability
imposed by the IDAPA as compared to the CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act and the
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In addition to this, these three promoter-liability bills also impose
significantly harsh penalties, both in terms of prison sentences and fines. A person
guilty of violating the Ecstasy Awareness Act or the IDAPA could be imprisoned
for up to twenty years, 193 and up to nine years for violating the CLEAN-UP of
Methamphetamines Act.194 Guilty parties could also be subject to fines of
$500,000 for individuals and $2 million for organizations.1 95 Furthermore, under
any of these three bills, guilty parties may be subject to forfeiture of the premises
used to commit their crimes, 196 which can mean millions of dollars in the context
of nightclubs and entertainment complexes.' 97
Finally, none of these promoter liability proposals contain any kind of safe
harbor provision allowing businesses to conduct legitimate activities without fear
of prosecution. 198 For each of these three Acts, liability is not usually a function
of people's actions, but of their minds. The only kinds of volitional acts required
by these bills are those inherent to the nature of the live entertainment business:
opening property to others, promoting an event, and profiting from an event.199
As a result, it is not likely that these volitional requirements would usually be a
significant issue when the laws are applied in the rave context. But more
Ecstasy Awareness Act, see, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S 1679 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (statement of
Senator Biden); 149 CONG. REC. S10,607 (daily ed. July 31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden),
all three Acts are trying to accomplish the same fundamental task of extending liability to
promoters and owners of raves and nightclubs who are not directly selling drugs. Of course,
these distinctions in the standard of liability imposed by the different Acts appear to be
significant and are important to keep in mind in considering their respective merits. See infra
Part V.B.2.
193 Ecstasy Awareness Act of 2003, H.R. 2962, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003); 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(b) (2000).
194 CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act, H.R 834, 108th Cong. § 305(a) (2003).
195 21 U.S.C. § 856(b) (2000); H.R. 2962 § 2 (2003).
196 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2000).
197 See Pfeffer Motion to Dismiss, supra note 139, at 31. Indeed, in the case of Club La
Vela, the defendants asserted that the forfeiture of their $30 million, ocean-side entertainment
complex was the primary motivation for their prosecution. Id. at 23. Apparently, 80% of these
seized assets would go to local law enforcement (which was responsible for the seizure and
arrests), 15% to the federal government, and 5% to charities. ELECTRONIC Music DEFENSE &
EDUCATION FUND, LAWS, LEGISLATION, LEGAL CASES, at
http://www.emdef.org/lawsand cases.html#floridalavela (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
198 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 23 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU).
199 IDAPA, S. 226, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2003) ("open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any
place"); id. § 2(a)(2) ("manage or control any place.., and... rent, lease, profit from, or make
available for use"); CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act, S. 2763 § 305(a) ("promotes
any... entertainment event"); H.R. 2962 § 2 ("profits monetarily from a rave or similar
electronic dance event").
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importantly, the Acts do not allow any avoidance of liability for actions taken to
prevent drug use.200 Instead, the focus rests almost entirely on a person's state of
mind-what he or she knew, should have known, or intended to occur. Because
this state of mind must be proved by inference from volitional acts,201 it is a much
more uncertain standard than that of an objective, volitional act requirement. This
means that promoters and owners can never be certain that-despite whatever
level of precautions they have taken to prevent or minimize drug use-some of
their actions will not ultimately be interpreted as showing an improper motive or
knowledge and used against them in civil or criminal proceedings. 202
It is this combination of uncertain liability in the face of severe punishment
that has led to much concern and criticism by the public and political
organizations. 20 3 So far, most of this discussion has focused on the RAVE Act.204
But these laws and enforcement strategies are rapidly becoming significant issues
200 Cf N.Y. PENAL LAw § 230.40 (Consol. 2004) ("A person is guilty of permitting
prostitution when, having possession or control of premises which he knows are being used for
prostitution purposes, he fails to make reasonable effort to halt or abate such use.") (emphasis
added).
201 See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463, 466-67 (7th Cir. 1993) (inferring that
the defendant maintained a house "for the purpose" of narcotics crimes in violation of the crack
house law, because he charged people a "cover charge" to smoke crack, and helped cook
cocaine into crack); United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1091-92 (11 th Cir. 1992) (inferring
that the defendants knowingly maintained a residence for a prohibited purpose under the crack
house law by, inter alia, transporting packages to and from the location, possessing firearms in
the location, and traveling "back and forth all day long" from the location).
202 See Hearings: RA VE Act, supra note 19, at 23 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU). Quite to the contrary, the mere fact that owners and
promoters have taken precautions to prevent drug use or minimize the harms associated with
drug use has been used against them, as evidence of their knowledge of drug use and intent to
facilitate its use. E.g., Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 8-9; Pfeffer Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 139, at 8-9.
203 See, e.g., Press Release, Drug Policy Alliance, Opposition to Dangerous Senate RAVE
Act Grows (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/pressroom/pressrelease/prjulyl8b_02.cfm (last visited Feb.
25,2005).
204 Despite being enacted as the IDAPA, the law's former, more memorable label seems
to have stuck in the press. See, e.g., Sasha Johnson, "Punkvoter" Founder Aims to Unify Youth
Vote, CNN, Nov. 4, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITCS/11/03/elecO4.punkvoter/index.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2005); Donald G. McNeil Jr., Report of Ecstasy Drug's Great Risks is Retracted, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at A8; Tricia Romano, A Little Night Music, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 6,
2004, at 19.
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in a broader public debate on our nation's drug policies and the implications of a
shift toward greater liability for owners and promoters of entertainment events.20 5
V. FRAMEWORK FOR DEBATES ON OWNER AND PROMOTER LIABILITY IN
CLUB DRUG INITIATIVES
Unfortunately, the lines of communication in this debate have become
crossed at times, with critics sometimes failing to distinguish between the
different Acts,206 and with legislators and law enforcement officials consequently
overlooking the legitimate concerns of those critics.207 There appear to be at least
three aspects of this miscommunication which negatively impact the ability of
interested parties to engage in a fruitful discussion of the validity, efficacy, and
desirability of owner and promoter liability in club drug initiatives: (1)
misunderstanding of the legitimate goals and concerns of pursuing this strategy,
(2) misconception of the meaning and values of the rave subculture, and (3)
misidentification of the legitimate concerns of critics of this strategy.
First, detractors of this strategy, who may feel that it unfairly targets or chills
certain forms of speech, have sometimes jumped to the conclusion that its
proponents are acting on invidious or discriminatory motivations-possibly
overlooking the legitimate goals and concerns that may also be behind this
strategy. 20 8 And just as the courts will not impute a wrongful intent to Congress
when interpreting a statute,209 critics should refrain from making such accusations
in a policy debate. The undesirable effect of doing so is to overlook the
proponents' underlying assumptions and goals-issues on which they are
presumably more receptive than an attack to their integrity.
205 See, e.g., Eric Pape et al., The Dutch Go to Pot, NEWsWEEK, Sept. 15, 2003, at 28
(contrasting the use of the RAVE Act in the United States with a growing legalization
movement in Europe and Canada); Geov Parrish, Rave On, SEATrLE WEEKLY, Oct. 29, 2003,
at 40 (describing the RAVE Act as "a tacit admission of the drug war's failure.... it's an
admission that people determined to use illicit substances are not being deterred by the existing
draconian laws").
206 See 149 CONG. REC. S5153 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden) (noting
that critics had confused the IDAPA with the CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act).
207 See id. (statement of Sen. Biden) (acknowledging confusion between the bills, but
offering only a conclusory explanation that the concems of critics were unfounded).
208 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S1678 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden)
("The reason that I introduced this bill was not to ban dancing, kill the 'rave scene' or silence
electronic music, all things of which I have been accused.").
209 See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994) ("[W]e do
not impute to Congress an intent to pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution as
construed by this Court.").
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Second, in their search for a solution to a legitimate problem of drug abuse,
proponents of more expansive liability for owners and promoters have often
overlooked or marginalized the unique moral, cultural, and artistic values of the
rave subculture that will likely be affected. 210 A number of statements by both
law enforcement and legislators have tended to reduce raves to little more than a
vehicle for drug activity. For example, a DEA report on drug control strategies
defined a rave as "a party designed to enhance a hallucinogenic experience
through music and behavior."211 Similarly, the U.S. Attorney in charge of
prosecuting the State Palace Theater case said "raves by definition are parties
where pulsating techno music, steam, and paraphernalia such as pacifiers,
chemical light sticks and flashing light rings are used to support highs from club
drugs like Ecstasy."212 These kinds of over-simplistic statements overlook the
many socially beneficial (and legal) aspects of the rave subculture.213
Furthermore, because the concept of owner and promoter liability has focused on
the rave scene, as opposed to other venues where drug use is common, statements
like these undoubtedly feed into the perception that persons are being targeted for
their music, rather than their criminal conduct. 214
Finally, this kind of miscommunication in a public debate may ultimately
cloud many of the serious issues. For example, when Senator Biden re-introduced
the RAVE Act in 2003, he responded to criticisms that the Act unfairly targeted
210 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. Chicago's mayor, Richard Daley has
gone one step farther, making an aggressive and panicked accusation against rave promoters,
declaring that "[t]hey are after all of our children." Jacob Sullum, Sex, Drugs, and Techno
Music: Why the Rap Against Ecstasy Has a Familiar Ring to It, Jan. 2002, at
http://www.reason.com/0201/fe.js.sex.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
211 DRUG CONTROL: DEA's STRATEGIES, supra note 76, at 126 n.8. The DEA has been
somewhat consistent in its narrow view of raves. In a DEA promotional video on club drugs,
agent David Gavin stated:
Lately raves are just a venue for drug purchases. They are no more than analogous to a
crack house, in which you go buy the drugs and go out the back door. Although there's
music being played, and the people at the raves are saying, "I come here for the music,"
drugs are predominant in these rave clubs. And it's just a mix of drugs and music, and it's
become a venue for drug purchases.
DEA Video, supra note 39. The DEA has also referred to raves as "glorified drug parties."
Leinwand, supra note 27.
212 Brett Martel, Indictment Could Bolster Investigations of Raves Nationwide, TIMEs-
PICAYUNE, Jan. 13, 2001, at Bl, available at
http://www.harreduction.org/issues/hmews/rave_support.html#nationwide (last visited Feb.
25, 2005).
213 See Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 10-13 (describing the pervasive
impact of electronic music on mainstream culture).
214 Cf id. at 16-18 (arguing that holding rave promoters liable ignores the prevalence of
drug use in many other comparable settings).
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raves (as opposed to other music events) by removing the "Findings" section215
and changing the title to the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act.216 But the
operative portions of the bill remained the same, despite having come under
heavy criticism. Several important arguments made at congressional hearings on
the RAVE Act, which went directly to the scope of liability created by the
operative portions of the Act and which could have been easily addressed by
minor draffing changes, were completely ignored.217
In particular, one of the most surprising and contentious issues in these
hearings was whether the "for the purpose" language in 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2)
applies to the accused person, or to the person who is admitted on to the accused's
property.218 For over thirteen years, courts have consistently ruled that this
wrongful "purpose" requirement does not apply to the accused,219 and critics
have argued that this interpretation essentially holds owners liable for the
purposeful actions of others.220 Even Senator Biden, as the author of the original
crack house law, has argued on the Senate floor against the courts'
interpretation.221 But when it came time to revise the statute, he did not even try
to clarify his intention by including what would have been a minor drafting
alteration.222 Thus, to some degree, addressing this controversial, substantive
aspect of owner and promoter liability was passed over in favor of making the
statute simply appear less discriminatory. 223
215 RAVE Act, S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 2 (2003). These "findings" focused the Act
squarely on the rave setting by documenting the relationship of ecstasy and raves, as well as the
kind of evidence believed to show a promoter's or owner's attempt to encourage or profit off
drug use. This evidence included selling bottled water, glow sticks, and massage oils, as well as
hiring off-duty police officers to patrol the venue. Id.
216 149 CONG. REc. S1678 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (statement of Senator Biden).
217 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 24-25 (prepared statement of Graham
Boyd, Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU).
218 See id at 55-58 (discussion of the mental element in 21 U.S.C. § 856); see also supra
note 119-20 and accompanying text.
2 19 United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tamez, 941
F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463,466 (7th Cir. 1993).
220 See, e.g., Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 55-58 (discussion of the mental
element in 21 U.S.C. § 856).
221 See 149 CONG. REC. S 10,607 (daily ed. July 31, 2003).
222 This could potentially have been accomplished as simply as changing "for the purpose
[of engaging in drug activity]" to "with the purpose [of engaging in drug activity]." See 21
U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2000).
223 This fact seems all the more inexplicable in light of the manner in which the IDAPA
was passed. As a rider on the PROTECT Act, the Act faced little chance of opposition in
whatever form it took. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
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It is situations like this that underscore the need for all sides in this ongoing
debate to have a well-founded understanding of each other's positions. The
following framework seeks to organize and discuss some of the more important
aspects of the various positions in an attempt to help all sides understand each
other more thoroughly, and thereby encourage more fruitful discussion.224
A. Positions Supporting More Expansive Owner and Promoter Liability
While the DEA and several members of Congress have clearly advocated
their support for more expansive liability of owners and promoters as a means of
addressing club drug abuse, there are also some business225 and drug-
awareness 226 organizations taking this side on the debate. Uniting these groups
are two particular issues: concern for the harmful effects of drug use on society,
and frustration over the inability to effectively counter these effects.
1. Concern
First and foremost, these persons are genuinely concerned about the growing
abuse of club drugs. In a number of congressional hearings, voluminous
testimony recounted the harmful effects of ecstasy and other drugs, both through
trafficking operations227 and from actual drug use.228 Furthermore, evidence
presented at these hearings shows that use of ecstasy is growing-spreading to
new geographic areas and to new groups of users.229
224 In light of the goals of this Note, it is not appropriate to give an exhaustive analysis of
each of the issues raised, or to come to a conclusive position on them. In the debate on owner
and promoter liability, it is up to each party to decide which issues are most central or
persuasive as to their particular interests. As such, this framework is intended to provide a
useful medium in which future discussions can take place.
225 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S1679 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (published statement of the
Coalition of Licensed Beverage Association, supporting the RAVE Act).
226 See, e.g., Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 15 (testimony of Judy Kreamer,
President, Educating Voices, Inc.).
227 See, e.g., Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Jim McDonough,
Dir., Fla. Office of Drug Control) ("[T]here is nothing 'benign' about the illegal trade in Ecstasy
and other club drugs. It is dangerous and potentially violent...."); id. (statement of Steven
Rust, Sergeant, Milford, Del. Police Dep't) ("Today, a new generation of illegal drugs threatens
our communities. It is bringing with it the burglaries, thefts, robberies and violence as seen with
crack.").
228 See, e.g., Hearings: Underestimating the Threat, supra note 46 (statement of Donald
R. Vereen, Jr., Deputy Dir., Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy) (discussing the various
adverse health effects of ecstasy use); Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of
Dr. Bill Jacobs, Medical Dir., Gateway Cmty. Servs.) (same).
229 See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
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But in particular, much of this concern focuses on the fact that the adverse
effects of club drug abuse fall disproportionately on the youth of the nation.
Evidence at congressional hearings reflected the fact that club drugs are primarily
abused by young adults, from eighteen to twenty-five years old,230 and included
several first-hand accounts by young victims of ecstasy use.231 This concern was
manifested in several "findings" in the RAVE Act concerning the abuse of drugs
by "young people" and "young adults. '232 Likewise, when discussing bills such
as the IDAPA, the CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act, and the Ecstasy
Prevention Act, proponents continually emphasize the importance of these Acts to
prevent the further spread of drugs to our children.233
Most importantly, there is widespread concern over the role that raves may
play as a forum in exposing or introducing these young persons to drugs.
Numerous studies have confirmed the anecdotal knowledge that drug use is
present at raves and nightclubs,234 and law enforcement and legislators are
concerned that drug use may not be simply occurring in raves, but may actually
be permitted or encouraged by some owners and promoters.235 As evidence of
this, they have referred to promoters directly selling drugs, getting kickbacks from
drug sales, telling security guards to ignore drug violations, or using rave
advertisements containing words and symbols with drug connotations. 236 Given
these legitimate concerns over youth drug use, it seems a relatively natural
response to extend some level of culpability to those encouraging drug use at
raves.
237
230 See, e.g., Hearings: Underestimating the Threat, supra note 46 (statement of Dr.
Donald R. Vereen, Jr., Deputy Dir., Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy).
231 Id. (statement of Amy Ross, sister of ecstasy victim); Hearings: America at Risk,
supra note 59 (statement of Vinnie and Michelle, clients, Daytop Suffolk Outreach and Daytop
Village).
232 RAVE Act, S. 2633, 107th Cong. §§ 2(1), 2(4), 2(5), 2(8) (2002).
233 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S10,606 (daily ed. July 31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden)
("[IDAPA] is only trying to deter illicit drug use and protect kids."); 149 CoNG. REC. E246
(2003) (Statement of Rep. Ose) (noting that the CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act will
help prosecute promoters of raves, where children are often first exposed to drugs); 147 CONG.
REC. S7967 (2001) (statement of Sen. Graham) (noting that the Ecstasy Prevention Act
"focus[es] on the serious danger it presents to our youth").
234 See, e.g., PULSE CHECK, supra note 68, at 81.
235 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REc. S5153 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden);
149 CONG. REc. E247 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2003) (statement of Rep. Ose); Hearings: Looking the
Other Way, supra note 11 (statement of Asa Hutchinson, Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.).
236 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S5153 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden).
237 Cf. Hearing Before the House Gov't Reform Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Res., 108th Cong. (2002) (statement of Asa Hutchinson, Adm'r, Drug
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2. Frustration
In light of these significant concerns and the attempts made to address them,
the fact that the use of club drugs has not been significantly curtailed has caused
frustration in several respects.238 First, traditional methods for reducing drug
activity have been somewhat less effective as applied to club drugs-ecstasy in
particular. In addition to users and sellers being notably young, thereby making
penetration of drug organizations more difficult,239 production and trafficking of
ecstasy has followed some unusual pattens.240 As a synthetic drug, ecstasy can
be produced in large amounts in relatively small labs, making detection of
manufacturers more difficult.24 1 And because ecstasy is transported in pill form, it
can be shipped in small packages-either through delivery services or by
individual couriers-that are more easily concealed than the kilogram-sized
packages required for drugs like cocaine, heroin, and marijuana.242 Given these
difficulties in reducing the supply of ecstasy, promoters and owners that
encourage drug use at their events are a comparatively attractive target. But
because existing drug laws are designed to target persons directly involved in the
manufacturing or trafficking of drugs, they are difficult to extend to those persons
who are merely complicit in drug trafficking but not directly involved.
Another cause for frustration is the continuing debate over the health effects
of ecstasy. Despite the extensive drug-awareness campaign aimed at ecstasy and
Enforcement Admin.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct091902p.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (noting that after the State Palace Theater management entered its
plea agreement, "club drug related overdoses in New Orleans have dropped 90%, with ecstasy
overdoses disappearing altogether"); INFORMATION BULLETiN: RAVEs, supra note 50, at 5
(same).
23 8 See Dave Kopel & Glenn Reynolds, Feel Like Dancing? Beware of Tom Daschle,
NAT'L REV. ONINE, Jan. 30, 2003, available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel013003.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). For
example, despite the rise in DEA arrests for ecstasy from 443 in 1999 to 1,792 in 2001, 1.6
million people tried ecstasy for the first time in 2001-2002. See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra
note 19, at 9, 10 (prepared statement of Asa Hutchinson, Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.)
("In 2001, 8.1 million Americans aged 12 and older had used ecstasy, up from 6.5 million in
2000.").
239 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
240 147 CONG. REC. S7966 (daily ed. July 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. Graham)
("[E]cstasy has erased all of the old routes law enforcement has mapped out for the smuggling
of traditional drugs.").
241 See Hearings: Underestimating the Threat, supra note 46 (statement of Rand Beers,
Assistant Sec'y of State, Int'l Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Dep't of State).
242 See id. (statement of Richard A. Fiano, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement
Admin.); id. (statement of Raymond W. Kelly, Comm'r, U.S. Customs) ("The drug's compact
size makes smuggling options almost infinite.").
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other club drugs,243 there is still uncertainty in public and scientific opinion as to
exactly how harmful ecstasy use is.244 Public opinion as to the general safety of
ecstasy use seems to be largely driven by the common sense observation that
despite the millions of ecstasy users worldwide, few users have died.245 In
scientific opinion, the dangers of hyperthermia and cardiac arrhythmias are
relatively well-accepted consequences of ecstasy use,246 but the debate over the
long-term neurological effects has been hotly contested, with some studies
showing no long-term effects at all and others showing severe short and long-
term effects.247 This inability to substantially alter the public perception of ecstasy
use undercuts the government's ability to deter the public's desire to use it, and
suggests that new procedures to reduce its abuse are required.248
243 See, e.g., Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 11 (prepared statement of Asa
Hutchinson, Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.) (describing the elements of "The Ecstasy and
Predatory Drug Awareness Campaign"); see also Children's Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-310, § 3665, 114 Stat. 1101, 1244 (2000) (providing funds for "Ecstasy and Other Club
Drugs Abuse Prevention" efforts); PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 608(g), 117 Stat. 650,
692 (2003) (authorizing appropriations for education about club drugs).
244 See, e.g., McNeil, supra note 61.
245 See, e.g., id. ("According to an annual federal survey, almost 10 million Americans
have tried Ecstasy. Few have died."); Press the Panic Button, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 25, 1997, at
3.
In Britain, it is estimated that at least halfa million people have taken ecstasy and that
around a million tablets are consumed each week. ...
Over the past ten years, six people a year are thought to have died as a result of taking
ecstasy in Britain.... Even pursuits such as mountain climbing, skiing and horse riding
kill more people.
Id.
246 See, e.g., Judith Lewis, Your Brain on Bad Science, L.A. WEEKLY, Sept. 12, 2003, at
20 (reporting that critics of long-term memory studies on ecstasy use note these dangers as
more certain and in need of greater study).
247 See, e.g., id. (discussing scientific debate over differing results of long-term
neurological studies); McNeil, supra note 61 (same). The debate has taken a particularly
embarrassing turn for the government after the premier study showing long-term neurological
damage from ecstasy use was retracted because four of the five primates in the experiment were
injected with methamphetamine rather than ecstasy. George A. Ricaurte et al., Retraction, 301
SCIENCE 1479 (2003); see also McNeil, supra note 61; Smith, supra note 40. This study was
heavily relied upon for the government's "This is your brain on ecstasy" campaign, and was
"widely quoted when Congress was lining up support for the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation
Act." Id.; cf 148 CONG. REC. S9699 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Graham)
(reprinting in the Congressional Record an article citing the results of Ricaurte's study, as
evidence in support of the need for the Ecstasy Prevention Act).
248 See Gomez, supra note 12 ("The real story is that federal law enforcement efforts
against ecstasy have proved impotent .... Frustrated by this failure, they've targeted electronic
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In sum, the situation confronting law enforcement is a growing abuse of
drugs that are widely believed to be dangerous in some respects, a particularly
young age of users, a diminished capacity to reduce supply (by counteracting the
drugs' trafficking and manufacturing) and demand (by altering public perception
of the drug's safety) and the fact that at least some rave promoters and owners
have played a role facilitating the use and sale of drugs. While these persons may
not always be directly involved in drug sales,249 they are providing a forum in
which it is likely that drug sales will occur. To some, this suggests that at least a
partial solution is to extend greater liability to these persons. Any meaningful
discussion of this argument must necessarily take these specific concerns and
frustrations into account.
B. Positions Opposing Expansive Owner and Promoter Liability
As reasonable as the above position may appear, most critics argue that the
problem is not with its goals, but with the means used to pursue themr250
Arguments against expanding liability to owners and promoters of events as a
means of addressing drug abuse can generally be grouped into three categories.251
First, there are arguments that this policy will not be effective at reducing drug
abuse or its harmful consequences. Second, the bills as drafted may be too vague
to allow business owners and promoters to know how they may conduct a
music concerts, raves, not because they're especially important targets, they're not, but because
they're easy and public targets.") (quoting Glenn Harlan Reynolds of FOX News); Jacob
Sullum, Party Poopers, REASoNONLINE, July 24, 2002, at
http://reason.com/links/links072402.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) ("Stung by critics who
say Ecstasy and other 'club drugs' are not as dangerous as they've made them out to be,
politicians seem determined to remedy the situation."); cf Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 128, at 14-15 ('The DEA has both succumbed to the media hype and furthered the panic
over ecstasy .... [F]eeling pressure from the media and the public, the DEA is targeting
electronic music concert promoters throughout the country, instead of going after those who are
actually involved with drugs.").
249 There have been instances where rave promoters were found to be directly involved in
distributing drugs at raves. See, e.g., Leinwand, supra note 27 (describing a Boise, Idaho rave
promoter who hired security to keep drugs out so that his own dealers could deal exclusively).
250 See, e.g., Hearings: RA VEAct, supra note 19, at 18 (statement of Graham Boyd, Dir.,
Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU) ("I think there is a recognition here that there are some Rave
promoters who are drug dealers .... [They have been] charged under the drug conspiracy laws,
because when you deal drugs, of course you are guilty of that crime. We don't need this act to
get those people.").
251 While some of these aspects are presented as issues of public policy, others are
couched in legal terms. However, these legal arguments are not meant to be a conclusive
discussion of the validity of any of these bills, but rather a more familiar and effective manner
of organizing and presenting particular concerns.
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legitimate event without exposing themselves to possible liability. And finally,
certain forms of speech, including music, dance, and political speech, may be
chilled because they will lack a forum for expression.
1. Efficacy
Some critics have argued that expanding liability to owners and promoters of
raves and nightclubs is simply not an effective manner of addressing the concerns
and frustrations regarding club drugs.252 First, it is unclear what percentage of
drug use or sales occur at raves or nightclubs, or what percentage of this would be
eliminated--or merely displaced-by making raves and nightclubs an
inopportune venue for drug activity.2 53 As was often noted in congressional
hearings, the use of club drugs is no longer confined to the rave and nightclub
scene, but has expanded into mainstream culture,254 and trafficking has grown to
include a number of other venues.255 Thus, even if some measures could ensure
that raves and nightclubs would be totally drug-free, those measures might be
ineffective at reducing overall drug use.
Critics have also argued that measures expanding liability for promoters and
owners will simply move drug use to other venues where the physical harms from
drug use may be greater.256 If licensed raves become more difficult to host, they
252 See, e.g., Philip Jenkins, Ecstasy and Synthetic Panics, J. CoGNTvE LIBERTIEs, Fall
2000, at 7, 27-28, available at http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/3jcl/3JCL7.htm (last visited Feb
25, 2005) ("Legislators are naturally and commendably concerned about the need to protect
young people .... But the danger is that in trying to offer better safeguards for youth, they will
enact new prohibitions and criminal justice-oriented policies which will result in causing more
harm, more injury and death.").
253 See Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 16-18.
254 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. Even before this cultural and
geographic expansion of drug use, it was not certain that raves were the exclusive venue for
club drug use to the extent that they were portrayed as such. See Alasdair J.M. Forsyth, Places
and Patterns of Drug Use in the Scottish Dance Scene, 91 ADDIcTION 511, 515 tbl. 2 (1996)
(Abindgon, England) (describing a 1996 study of drug use in Scotland, which showed only
3.3% of ecstasy use occurred at "licensed" raves, while 59% occurred in traditional nightclubs,
and 30.3% occurred in private homes).
255 See PULSE CHECK, supra note 68, at 81 exhibit 8. Of the twenty-one cities included in
this 2001 study of drug use in the United States, twenty reported sales of club drugs at raves and
concerts, eighteen at nightclubs and bars, eighteen at college campuses, seventeen at private
residences, and fourteen at private parties. Id. While this is not meant to say that eliminating
raves and nightclubs as a venue for drug sales would not help reduce drug trafficking to some
degree, it does raise the possibility that trafficking will simply shift to these other venues.
256 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 24 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU); Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 19; cf
Weir, supra note 49, at 1847 (noting that measures in Great Britain attempting to ban raves as a
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may simply be driven back underground to the abandoned warehouses and fields
where they began.257 This in turn may lead to increased harm from drug use,
because these venues will lack adequate security, running water, air conditioning,
medical staff, transportation, and other elements that help reduce the prevalence
and physical harms of drug use.258
According to this argument, the above concerns and frustrations may merit
taking some kind of action, but expanding owner and promoter liability will
simply be ineffective at achieving the desired reduction in the use of or harms
caused by club drugs. In contrast, the remaining arguments contend that even if
this policy of expanding owner and promoter liability would be able to achieve
the desired reduction in the use of club drugs, the costs of doing so would
outweigh the benefits.
2. Vagueness
A major concern of critics has been the uncertain sweep of the laws: what
conduct does it criminalize, and what guidelines will allow business persons to
host legitimate entertainment events without fear of prosecution? 259 Although this
argument has strong merit simply on grounds of public policy,260 a constitutional
perspective is also illustrative. The basic constitutional rule of vagueness is "that
drug control measure simply moved the drug use into nightclubs and "increased the risks
involved with mixing drugs and alcohol"); Michael J. Rieder, Some Light from the Heat:
Implications of Rave Parties for Clinicians, 162 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1829, 1829 (2000),
available at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/162/13/1829 (last visited Feb. 25, 2005)
("[B]ans may prolong the popularity of the rave scene and make rave-related problems more
difficult to control ....").2 57 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 24 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU); Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 19.
258 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 24 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU); Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 19;
Sullum, supra note 248.259 See, e.g., Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 23 (prepared statement of Graham
Boyd, Dir., Drug Litig. Project, ACLU); Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 28-30;
Pfeffer Motion to Dismiss, supra note 139, at 25-30; see also Shadi Kardan, Comment, The
Government's New War on Drugs: Threatening the Right to Dance!, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 99, 118-20 (2003) (discussing vagueness of the original crack house law
as applied to rave promoters).
260 That is, even if laws basing liability for owners and promoters on their mere
knowledge of drug use would survive constitutional scrutiny, any uncertainties in the law could
still affect the multi-billion dollar live entertainment industry in the United States, which is
certainly a factor to be weighed in considering the desirability of this policy. See XENTEL,
ANNUAL REPORT (2000), http://www.xentel.com/xentel/2000annual/00company.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005) (reporting that the United States's live entertainment industry in 1999
generated more than $11 billion).
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an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."261
But within this general rule there are three components, all of which are at issue
here.
First, laws must provide "fair warning," by "giv[ing] the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited."262 The premise
of this idea is that if people know what a law prohibits, they will be able to avoid
liability if they so desire.263 For owners and promoters in the live entertainment
business, this means they must be able to choose a manner of conducting a
legitimate event that will not create liability. However, the circumstances
surrounding the State Palace Theater and Club La Vela undermine this possibility
with respect to 21 U.S.C. § 856. In both cases, the owners played no part in the
sale or distribution of drugs, and took measures above and beyond normal
security to prevent and punish users and sellers of drugs.264 But charges were still
brought, as well as a $30 million forfeiture suit.265 Furthermore, some of the
measures taken to prevent drug use or minimize its harms were even used against
these persons as evidence of wrongdoing.2 66 Other business owners and
promoters looking to these cases for guidance on how to conduct an
entertainment event in a manner that avoids prosecution under the crack house
law will find little help.
This problem is even more stark with regard to the CLEAN-UP of
Methamphetamines Act and the Ecstasy Awareness Act. Whereas the crack
house law has two mental elements, knowledge and purpose,267 in these Acts,
knowledge of drug use is the only mental element.268 And furthermore, actual
knowledge of drug use is not even required--these Acts are satisfied where the
owner or promoter "reasonably ought to know" or has "reason to know" of drug
use.269 But because some drug use is present at most concerts and entertainment
events, owners and promoters will always have "reason to know" that drug
activity will occur at one of their events-it is simply inherent in the nature of
261 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
265 See supra note 140.
266 These measures included calling the police to arrest drug offenders, having medical
assistance on duty, and selling bottled water. See Pfeffer Motion to Dismiss, supra note 139, at
6-7; Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 8-9.
267 As noted, the purpose requirement in § 856(a)(2) has been effectively read out by
judicial interpretation. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
268 See supra notes 180, 184 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 180, 184 and accompanying text.
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their occupation. 270 Essentially, it is the mere fact that they are allowing a crowd
of persons to gather for an entertainment event that creates liability, regardless of
any actions taken to prevent drug use. The result is that they have no way of
knowing how they may conduct a legitimate event in a manner that will not make
them liable.
The second aspect of vagueness is a concern for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. As such, "laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them," and may not "delegate[ ] basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis."'271 The CLEAN-UP of
Methamphetamines Act and the Ecstasy Awareness Act appear to provide little
guidance as to where and when law enforcement agencies should apply them.
Their only requirements are that the event in question is an entertainment event of
some sort, and that the owner or promoter generally has reason to know that drug
use will occur.272 But as just discussed, this could potentially implicate any
entertainment event, regardless of the intent of the owners or promoters or any
precautions they have taken. Therefore, the decision of exactly which
entertainment events to investigate or prosecute is left entirely in the hands of law
enforcement and prosecutors. In light of the manner in which the crack house law
has been used, there is reason to suspect that this enforcement would be sought
against particular kinds of music or speech, while other venues equally culpable
would remain exempt.273 Presumably, Congress would not intend to enact laws
that create immediate and severe liability for virtually the entire entertainment
industry, but these two Acts appear to do just that, by failing to provide "explicit
standards" as to when and where they should be enforced.
Although the crack house law offers additional guidance to law enforcement
in that it requires a second mental element, it may ultimately do little to remove
the wide discretion that poses a risk of discriminatory enforcement.2 74 Unlike the
other two Acts, the crack house law applies to any venue or building regardless of
the kind of legitimate activity taking place-it is left up to law enforcement to
decide where and when enforcement will be pursued.275 As interpreted and
270 Cf Pfeffer Motion to Dismiss, supra note 139, at 22; Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 128, at 26.
271 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
272 See supra notes 180, 184 and accompanying text.
273 Cf Pfeffer Motion to Dismiss, supra note 139, at 22; Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 128, at 24-26; Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 22-23 (prepared statement of
Graham Boyd, Dir., Drug Litig. Project, ACLU).274 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 22-23 (prepared statement of Graham
Boyd, Dir., Drug Litig. Project, ACLU).
275 See id. The attitude of the prosecution in the State Palace Theater case seems to reflect
this, by acknowledging that using the crack house law in the situation was "a reach."
Apparently, they decided to bring the case under this statue, not because the promoters had
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enforced by the DEA in the State Palace Theater and Club La Vela cases, this law
applies to situations where drug use is present but the owners and promoters have
not played any direct part in the sale or use of those drugs.276 Conceivably, such
an interpretation could implicate most forms of live entertainment, as well as
other forums such as schools and private residences. But as evidenced by the
Department of Justice's guidelines for enforcement of the crack house law, the
DEA has decided that-apart from situations where owners are directly involved
with the sale of drugs-this law will be selectively enforced against raves and
electronic music events. 277 Thus, the vagueness of this law allows the DEA to
first give it a broad interpretation-4aking it out of the context of crack houses and
direct involvement in drug activity-and to then enforce it in a specific,
discriminatory manner.
The third reason that vague laws are problematic is because of their chilling
effect upon lawful or protected conduct. A law that does not give citizens "fair
warning" about what conduct is prohibited "operates to inhibit the exercise of
individual freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitution''278 because it
will "lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone... than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. '279 These concerns are
even more pointed in cases where conduct protected by the Constitution may be
chilled. "The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may
derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success
or failure."280 As such, where a "law interferes with the right of free speech or of
association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply."
281
Because music is a form of protected speech under the First Amendment,
282
critics argue that these proposed laws and enforcement policies impermissibly
clearly violated this law, but because it was "the only statute that seemed to fit." See Leinwand,
supra note 27.
276 See supra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
277 See INFORMATION BuLLETIN: RAvES, supra note 50, at 5-6. To some extent, this is
true for local law enforcement, which may assist in implementing these laws.
278 Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
279 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (internal quotes and citations
omitted).
280 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,487 (1965).
281 Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
282 Ward v. Rock against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music, as a form of
expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment."). To the extent that
the right to host a music event is concerned, the Ninth Circuit has held that the First
Amendment's right to free speech includes the right of promoters to conduct a musical event.
Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 566-69 (9th Cir. 1984).
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chill protected conduct through their vagueness.283 To begin, the lack of clear
standards for prohibited conduct and the absence of safe harbor provisions make
it difficult for business owners to know how to conduct a legitimate event in a
way that will not result in prosecution or conviction.284 In addition to this, all
three bills carry heavy penalties-in the forms of prison, fines, and forfeiture-
that await any legitimate business owners who guess incorrectly about how to
conduct an event safely.285 But most importantly, business owners and promoters
are aware that these laws are not (or would not be, if enacted) enforced
evenhandedly with respect to the kinds of music or speech taking place.286 The
result is that promoters and owners may be more reluctant to host those events
that unreasonably increase their likelihood of prosecution, conviction, or
forfeiture.
While there is some anecdotal evidence that this chilling effect has already
begun,287 an incident in Billings, Montana clearly supports this argument. On
May 30, 2003, the Eagles Lodge was scheduled to host a fund-raising concert for
Montana State University's chapters of the National Organization for the Reform
of Marijuana Laws (NORML) and Students for a Sensible Drug Policy.288 This
concert came to an unexpected halt when a DEA agent approached the Eagles
Lodge manager and informed her that if anyone were caught using illegal drugs at
the event, the lodge would be liable for a $250,000 fine.289 The manager referred
the matter to the Lodge trustees who, after conferring with their lawyers, decided
283 See, e.g., Pfeffer Motion to Dismiss, supra note 139, at 11; Bnnet Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 128, at 28-30; Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 24 (prepared statement of
Graham Boyd, Dir., Drug Litig. Project, ACLU).
284 Cf Jacob Sullum, The Chill Is On: Fighting Raves, Squelching Speech,
REASONONLINE, July 18, 2003, at http://reason.com/sullum/071803.shtml (last visited Feb. 25,
2005) ("For anxious venue owners, the question is not whether the government could impose a
civil fine or obtain a conviction that would be upheld on appeal; the question is whether a
federal agent might think it's worth a shot.").285 See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
286 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 23-24 (prepared statement of Graham
Boyd, Dir., Drug Litig. Project, ACLU).
287 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 204; Mona Jonz, Rave Act Protest, Sept. 9, 2003, at
http://www.shejay.net/01feat-articles/articlesraveactupdate.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005)
(noting that since the passage of the IDAPA, there has been a decrease in activity for a DJ
booking agency, and that Camel pulled its "club sponsorship program"); see also Pelisek, supra
note 12 (noting reports of promoters who feel the RAVE Act would put rave promoters out of
business).
288 Steven Wishnia, Raving Mad: New Drug Law Limits Gatherings, IN THESE TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2003, at 6, available at http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/345/ (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005).
289 Id.
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not to risk the fine and cancelled the event.290 Although the DEA said that the
warning was not motivated by the content of the event, 291 and has since issued
internal guidelines on enforcing the crack house law,292 the chilling effect was
nonetheless accomplished. Understandably, business owners remain skeptical
about the DEA's future enforcement of the crack house law.
293
Any chilling effects of the CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act and the
Ecstasy Awareness Act would probably be even greater than those for the crack
house law. First, whereas the crack house law applies broadly to any
establishment, these Acts are targeted at entertainment venues.294 Furthermore,
these Acts only require constructive knowledge, rather than actual knowledge and
intent, which means there would be even less guidance for how legitimate
business owners and promoters could avoid liability for legitimate events.295 As a
result, owners and promoters engaging in the targeted businesses may have even
more reason to abstain from hosting events than would those same persons under
the crack house law.
Because these Acts raise concerns of fair warning, arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and the chilling of protected conduct, opponents of
expanding owner and promoter liability may ultimately be able to challenge their
290 Sullum, supra note 284. The manager reported that the penalties threatened by the
DEA "freaked me out." Id.
291 David Crisp, Free Drugs or Free Speech?, BILLINGS OUTPOST, June 12, 2003, at A2,
available at http://www.billingsnews.com/story?storyid=5213&issue= 152 (last visited Feb. 25,
2005). The Eagles Lodge has hosted alternative and punk concerts in the past without receiving
a warning, and in this same interview, this DEA agent noted his "unapologetic" disapproval of
medical marijuana laws. Id.
292 See Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Questions for the Record for Karen Tandy, at
http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/bidenqstandy.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). These
guidelines have not been made public, but have been summarized on the DEA website. See
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMiN., FAQs ABOUT THE ILLICrr DRUG ANTI-PROLIFERATION ACT
(2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/ongoing/anti-proliferationact.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2005). The guidelines require agents to contact headquarters before seeking enforcement of the
crack house law, and reaffirm the necessity of the "knowledge" and "purpose" requirements of
the statute. See id. These guidelines were prompted in part by Senator Biden, who was
reportedly troubled by this action of the DEA. See Drug Policy Alliance, Author ofRA VE Act
Pushes DEA to Create Guidelines, July 16, 2003, at
http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/07_16 03raveact.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). But it is
also interesting to note that Senator Biden was not troubled by the prosecutions in the State
Palace Theater or Club La Vela cases, and in fact used the failures of the prosecutors in those
cases as an argument in support of the IDAPA. See 149 CoNG. REC. S1678 (daily ed. Jan. 28,
2003) (statement of Sen. Biden).
293 See Wishnia, supra note 288.
294 See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
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validity.2 96 However, these arguments also represent the attitudes of many of the
businesspersons who must make costly decisions based on these laws--costly in
terms of both the money and rights at stake. As a consequence of these decisions,
performers and attendees could lose an integral venue for expressing their music
and speech. As such, revisions addressing the vagueness of the law, while perhaps
not constitutionally necessary, could alleviate these concerns on a public policy
level and help find a middle ground between critics and proponents.
3. Free Speech
An additional concern is that these bills may infiinge upon the right to free
speech of promoters, owners, and attendees. As a matter of public policy, this
concern is essentially the same as the previous one-expansive promoter and
owner liability may lead to a chilling effect on speech or may be enforced in a
discriminatory manner against certain kinds of speech.297 But from a legal
standpoint, the content or enforcement of these laws may raise concerns apart
from vagueness that, in turn, may suggest additional solutions or grounds for
compromise.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech. '298 The Supreme Court
has laid out a three-step inquiry to review laws such as the ones at issue in this
Note.299 The first step asks whether the law completely bans a form of speech or
whether it merely regulates the time, place, or manner of that speech.300 If the law
296 The original crack house law has withstood several constitutional challenges on
vagueness grounds. See United States v. Milani, 739 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United
States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079 (1 1th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250
(D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Rosa, 50 Fed. Appx. 226 (6th Cir. 2002). However, in each
of these cases, the defendants were directly involved in the manufacture or distribution of drugs.
These challenges have not been ruled upon where the law was applied to owners or promoters
of raves and other entertainment events, and all of those challenges occurred before the 2003
IDAPA amendments.
297 Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 23-24 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU) (discussing these concerns in terms of free speech and
vagueness).
298 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
299 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-55 (1986); see also
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 433-434 (2002) (plurality opinion)
(describing the analytic framework used in Renton). But see id. at 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(interpreting Renton's framework differently than the plurality, but agreeing with Renton's
"central holding").300 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46; Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434 (plurality opinion).
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completely bans the speech, then it receives strict scrutiny review.30 1 If the law is
a time, place, or manner restriction, the second step asks if the law is content-
neutral or content-based. 30 2 Content-based laws are "considered presumptively
invalid and subject to strict scrutiny. '303 But if the law is content-neutral, the third
step will uphold the law if it is "designed to serve a substantial governmental
interest and do[es] not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication."304  Therefore, in order to avoid the presumptive
unconstitutionality of strict scrutiny, a law must be a content-neutral time, place,
or manner restriction.
Because none of the laws being considered in this Note completely ban any
form of speech, they are properly analyzed as time, place, or manner
restrictions.305 The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether these laws are content-
neutral. An exhaustive analysis of this complex issue is outside the scope of this
Note, but even a brief consideration shows that opponents of owner and
promoter-liability laws have grounds for arguing that they are content-based and
therefore presumptively invalid.
The "fundamental principal" of content-neutrality is that the government can
not regulate speech because it disagrees with its content.306 Thus, a law is
considered content-neutral if it is 'justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech."30 7 But a law merely regulating the "secondary effects" of a
particular form of speech is not considered content-based, even if the text of the
law refers to the content of the speech.30 8 For such a law, the government's non-
301 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46; Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434 (plurality opinion);
EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 273-74 (2001).
302 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47; Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434 (plurality opinion).
303 Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434 (plurality opinion); see Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47.
304 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47; see Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434 (plurality opinion).
305 The laws at issue in Renton prohibited adult theaters from being "located within 1,000
feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school."
Renton, 475 U.S. at 46. Since this did not qualify as a complete ban on adult theaters, it would
be difficult to argue that holding owners of entertainment venues liable for drug activity in their
venues is a complete ban on the speech occurring within those venues. But see Brunet Motion
to Dismiss, supra note128, at 13-16 (arguing that the DEA's goal in enforcing the crack house
law against raves is actually to silence the underlying speech).
306 Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49.
307 Id. at 48 (citations omitted).
308 Id. at 47-49. But see Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Although four Justices in Alameda Books agreed with this reading of Renton, Justice Kennedy
believed that laws referring on their faces to the content of regulated speech should still be
deemed content-based. Id. However, he agreed with the plurality that laws justified by reference
to their "secondary effects," should be subject to the intermediate scrutiny described in Renton.
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discriminatory interest in regulating the secondary effects of the speech is thought
to negate the inference that the government is impermissibly regulating the
speech because it disapproves of its content.30 9
Each of the owner and promoter liability laws at issue here is presumably
justified as regulating drug activity as a secondary effect of musical speech. They
would therefore appear to be content-neutral, and only subject to intermediate
scrutiny. However, they differ in an important respect from laws previously
considered under the secondary effects doctrine, in that they are significantly
underinclusive with respect to the kinds of speech responsible for the secondary
effect. They thus raise the concern that the government is actually regulating
because it disapproves of the content of the speech, and therefore conflict with the
"fundamental principal" of content-neutrality.
Renton provides an appropriate illustration of this argument. The Court in
that case upheld an ordinance restricting the location of adult movie theaters in
order to "prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values,
and generally protect and preserve the quality of the city's neighborhoods,
commercial districts, and the quality of urban life."'310 Adult movie theaters are
arguably the only kind of theaters that contribute negatively to these secondary
effects, and the law accordingly covered all adult theaters.
But suppose the ordinance had only restricted the location of adult theaters
showing homosexual adult films or interracial adult films; in that case it would
have been significantly underinclusive with respect to the kinds of theaters
responsible for the secondary effects supposedly being regulated.31' Such
underinclusiveness would raise the concern that the city was not actually
interested in regulating the secondary effects of adult theaters, but simply wanted
to ban homosexual or interracial adult films because it disapproved of them. This
would violate the "fundamental principal" of content-neutrality, and thus it seems
doubtful that the Court would subject such a law to intermediate scrutiny. To
overcome the discriminatory implications of such a narrow ordinance, the city
would undoubtedly have to present extremely convincing proof that homosexual
or interracial adult films contribute to the secondary effects in a unique manner or
degree.
309 Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49; see also Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448-49 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). This "secondary effects" doctrine has received substantial criticism by justices and
scholars alike. See, e.g., Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 334-35 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); Marcy Straussy, From Witness to Riches: The
Constitutionality of Restricting Witness Speech, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 291 (1996) (summarizing
criticisms); Kimberly K. Smith, Comment, Zoning Adult Entertainment: A Reassessment of
Renton, 79 CAL. L. REv. 119 (1991).
3 10 Id. at 48 (internal punctuation omitted).
311 Another example might be a law that only held promoters of Republican political
events liable if they have reason to know of drug activity during their events.
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The same form of underinclusiveness is found in the owner and promoter
liability laws. The Ecstasy Prevention Act only applies to raves, and the Ecstasy
Awareness Act applies only to "a rave or similar electronic dance event."312 They
single out a forum for one particular kind of music, despite evidence of ecstasy
use at other kinds of concerts, nightclubs, and private parties, and the common
association of drugs with other forms of music including reggae, acid rock, hip-
hop, and jazz.313 What reason could the government have for excluding these
other locations of drug activity, unless it were actually more concerned with
suppressing electronic music than with controlling drugs?
In comparison, the CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act applies to a "rave,
dance, music, or other entertainment event '314 and therefore does not explicitly
single out a particular form of music or entertainment for regulation. Despite
mentioning raves and dances, this Act appears to include any form of
"entertainment event." However, the section heading, "Promoters of Commercial
Drug-Oriented Entertainment," seems to undercut this conclusion. 315 That
heading implies that the government is really only regulating forms of speech that
it deems to be "drug-oriented." The question then becomes whether the
government can present sufficient evidence to justify singling out certain forms of
entertainment as "drug-oriented," in order to dispel the inference that it is simply
regulating forms of entertainment of which it disapproves.
Furthermore, this Act singles out forums for "entertainment," but does not
include forums for other kinds of speech. Evidence shows that drug activity at
raves and concerts is equal to or less than that at college campuses, schools, or
private parties.316 But what is the government's interest in excluding those other
locations from the scope of this law? Why does it feel is it justified in regulating
forums for entertainment or musical speech but not other locations with equal or
greater drug activity? The government's goal of reducing drug activity may dispel
the inference of content-based discrimination, but its decision to regulate only
312 Ecstasy Prevention Act of 2001, H.R. 2582, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001); Ecstasy
Awareness Act of 2003, H.R. 2962, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
313 See Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 6 (noting that jazz, reggae, and rock
music also share a reputation for high incidents of drug activity); PULSE CHECK, supra note 68,
at 81 (showing that ecstasy use at raves is similar to its use at nightclubs, college campuses,
private residences, and private parties). -
314 CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines Act, H.R 834, 108th Cong. § 305(a) (2003).
3 15 1d.
3 16 See PULSE CHECK, supra note 68, at 15, 35, 48, 81. In relevant part, this report
surveyed twenty-one cities with respect to sales of heroin, crack-cocaine, powder-cocaine, and
ecstasy, asking where each drug was sold among a number of locations, including raves and
concerts, schools, college campuses, and private parties. The responses to these surveys show
that there were a total of forty-nine reports of sales at raves and concerts, forty-eight at schools,
sixty at college campuses, and sixty-one at private parties. Id. (author's summary of statistics).
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some forums for speech associated with drug activity reinstates that
fundamentally impermissible inference.
By comparison, the federal crack house law is a content-neutral statute that
applies to "any place," 317 and therefore does not raise the same kind of concerns
as the other two Acts. The Supreme Court held in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.3 18
that applying a state's content-neutral statute to a situation where free speech
conduct occurs is not automatically unconstitutional, even if it does incidentally
burden the speech activities. 319 However, some critics have still argued that the
application of the crack house law to promoters and owners who are not directly
involved in drug trafficking does violate the First Amendment.320 This is because
the behavior covered by the statute-knowingly opening any place-is the very
same behavior that implicates free speech.321 By comparison to Arcara, opening
a bookstore and permitting prostitution are completely distinct acts,322 but under
the crack house law, promoting or hosting a rave and knowingly opening a place
for the sale of drugs are the same act.323 The chilling effect and burden placed on
protected conduct are therefore greater when the crack house law is applied in the
context of raves and musical events.
Finally, to the extent that the crack house law is justified by the secondary
effects doctrine, it application raises the same concerns as the two Acts discussed
above.324 Enforcement strategies like the Department of Justice bulletin325 and
317 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2000).
318 Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
319 Id. at 704-07 (upholding application of an anti-prostitution statute to a bookstore,
despite burdening the defendant's First Amendment right to operate a business involving
speech).
320 See, e.g., Christina L. Sein, Note, The Agony and the Ecstasy: Preserving First
Amendment Freedoms in the Government's War on Raves, 12 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 139
(2002) (arguing for overbreadth of the crack house law as applied to promoters and owners not
directly involved with drug trafficking).
321 Id. at 158.
322 See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704-07.
323 Sein, supra note 320, at 158. In other words, the protected conduct and the unlawful
conduct in Arcara were distinct and severable, meaning the chilling effect on one does not
affect the other. But under the crack house law, both the protected and prohibited conduct are
the same act-meaning the chilling effect on one inherently transfers to the other. See id. And
to the extent that acts prior to an event may be used to show someone's knowledge or purpose
under the crack house law, the actual act being prohibited is still the hosting of the event. See
infra note 334 and accompanying text.
324 The question of whether a facially neutral law may be considered content-based
because of its impact has yet to be directly addressed by the Supreme Court, and its decisions
do not point to a clear outcome. For a brief discussion of this issue, see ERwIN CHEMERINSKY,
CoNsTrTIoNAL LAw: PRINCiPLEs AND PoUcIEs 908-09 (2d ed. 2002).
[Vol. 66:511
"CLUB DRUG' INITIATIVES
statements from the DEA that specifically target raves for enforcement but ignore
other venues of drug trafficking appear to be underinclusive and may even raise
concerns of selective prosecution. 326
As shown above, the debate over expanding liability for owners and
promoters as a means of addressing club drugs involves many important and
related issues of law and policy. But when considered within the fiamework
provided in this Note, the issues may be somewhat more manageable and the
debate more productive. On the one side, the major motivations for expanding
liability are concerns about drug abuse and frustration over the ineffectiveness of
current procedures. On the other side, the major motivations for opposing this
expansion are that it may be ineffective, that the vagueness inherent in the Acts
may prevent a genre of music and a form of speech from being expressed, and
that the drafting and enforcement of the Acts may discriminate against particular
forms of speech.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR ADVANCING THE DEBATE ON OWNER AND PROMOTER
LIABILITY
While the goal of the preceding discussion is to provide a neutral framework
for continued discussion on the extent to which promoters and owners of
entertainment should be liable for drug activity occurring on their premises, this
section seeks to advance this discussion. Other commentators have suggested that
rather than expanding liability for owners and promoters, law enforcement should
use asset forfeiture laws,327 public nuisance actions,328 or simply prosecute drug
dealers directly under existing laws.329 These are all important alternatives to
consider, but there may also be ways to construct liability for owners and
325 See INFORMATION BULLETIN: RAVES, supra note 50, at 5-6.
326 See, e.g., Hearings: America at Risk, supra note 59 (statement of Donnie Marshall,
Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Admin.). The DEA Administrator's statements seem to suggest that
raves as a whole would be targeted, not simply those raves which were being used as a cover
for drug activity. See id.; Sein, supra note 320, at 148. If this were true, the DEA might be
selectively prosecuting owners and promoters of electronic music precisely because of the
specific content of their speech, which may amount to selective prosecution. See Arcara, 478
U.S. at 707 n.4 (noting that if the defendant had claimed that the anti-prostitution statute were
being enforced against him because of his particular speech, this could amount to
unconstitutional selective prosecution) (emphasis added); see generally Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 605 (1985) (explaining a prima facie case of selective prosecution as (1) others in
a similar position were not prosecuted for similar conduct and (2) prosecution was pursued on
"impermissible grounds, such as race, religion, or exercise of First Amendment rights").
327 See Michael H. Dore, Note, Targeting Ecstasy Use at Raves, 88 VA. L. REV. 1583,
1612 (2002).3 28 See Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 238.
329 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 21 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU).
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
promoters that directly address the contentious issues discussed above. Two
possible solutions are adding a safe-harbor provision and content-neutral drafting.
As simple as it may appear, a safe harbor provision may do much for both
sides in this debate. Such a provision need not undermine the effect of any law or
temper the operative language, but would simply state conditions where liability
would not be imposed.330 As a source for a safe harbor provision, laws creating
liability for permitting prostitution on one's property may serve as a useful guide.
These laws have been enacted by several states, and generally impose liability
when a person having possession of a building has knowledge or reasonable
cause to know that the building is being used for prostitution.331 What is
particularly interesting is that every one of these statutes contains a safe harbor
provision, so that persons are liable only if they "fail to make reasonable effort to
halt or abate such use." 332
In the context of liability for owners and promoters of entertainment events,
this same safe harbor provision would give guidance to persons seeking to host
such events as well as to law enforcement seeking to apply any such statute.
Owners and promoters could still host large-scale events where drug use is
inherently very likely to occur, but could rest assured that if they took reasonable
precautions to prevent drug use or sales at their event, they would not face
prosecution, jail, fines, or forfeiture.333 Likewise, law enforcement would have a
relatively clear standard for determining whether a given event warrants
investigation or arrests. Rather than having to use tangential and often
inconclusive evidence to try to infer whether owners and promoters have
33 0 See, e.g., id. at 24 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd, Dir., Drug Policy Litig.
Project, ACLU).
331 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-89 (2003); 11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1355
(2003); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 529.070 (2003); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 230.40 (2003); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.88.090 (2004); 9 GuAM CODE ANN. § 28.25(4) (2003).
332 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-89 (2003); 11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1355 (2003);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 529.070 (2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.40 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.88.090 (2004); 9 GuAM CODE ANN. § 28.25(4) (2003). It is interesting to note that
there are a number of state public nuisance statutes and laws creating liability for operating a
house of prostitution that allow permissive liability. But most of these statutes also require that
the premises be used "for the purpose" of prostitution, and do not impose liability unless the
person has actual knowledge of prostitution. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-204 (2003);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-10 (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.07(2)(c) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 712-1201, 712-1204 (2003); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-17 (2004); IOWA CODE § 99.1A
(2003); Miss. CODE ANN. § 95-3-1 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-804 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-204(3) (2004); Omno REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.01(c)(2) (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 1028(d) (2003); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-30-1(1) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 47-1-1 (2003); W.
VA. CODE § 61-8-5 (2003); Wis. STAT. § 823.09 (2003).
333 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 23, 24 (prepared statement of Graham
Boyd, Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU).
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"knowledge" of drug use (either actual or constructive) or are holding an event
"for the purpose" of such use,334 they can look for more objective and readily
identifiable measures that the owner or promoter has taken to prevent drug use. If
these measures are unreasonable, there are firm grounds for proceeding with
further investigation; if not, law enforcement can move on without feeling that
they have walked away from a potential danger.
Of course, what exactly constitutes "reasonable" measures to prevent drug
activity is still open to some interpretation, but it would have to be defined by
reference to the common practices of the live entertainment industry. Doing so
would help give owners, promoters, and law enforcement a shared and more
objective guide as to what kinds of precautions are appropriate and expected.
Also, measuring compliance with respect to industry practice provides a more
solid justification for imposing liability on owners and promoters. Rather than
being liable for their mere knowledge of drug activity (a trait shared by all of the
industry), owners and promoters would be liable for failing to take the reasonable
precautions that the rest of the industry has adopted. As a result, a safe harbor
provision would alleviate most of the vagueness concerns discussed above by
providing clear guidance to business owners and law enforcement as to how a law
should be interpreted and enforced.
Including a safe harbor provision would also allow laws expanding liability
for owners and promoters to address the concerns and frustrations discussed
above, because a safe harbor provision would not undermine the operative
portions of any such statute. It would simply focus the statute's operation on only
those situations where persons were criminally irresponsible. If owners or
promoters are participating in drug sales-either directly or through their staff-
they are certainly not taking reasonable precautions. 335 Likewise, if promoters tell
security guards to ignore drug use or sales, they are certainly not taking
reasonable precautions and would be liable. And even if owners or promoters are
simply derelict in their duty to host a safe and lawful event, for example, by
failing to employ a security staff in a situation where they know drug use is going
to occur, they would not be protected by a safe harbor provision.
But in those situations where an owner or promoter chooses to host an event
where drug use is likely-even virtually certain-to occur, and they take
reasonable precautions to prevent and abate that use, a safe harbor offers
reasonable and desirable protection from criminal prosecution and liability.
334 Much of the evidence in the State Palace Theater and Club La Vela cases was based
on factors such as selling bottled water, blow pops, having air conditioned rooms, and having
medical personnel on call. See Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 8-9; Pfeffer
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 139, at 8-9.
335 Of course, they would also be directly liable for drug trafficking under 21 U.S.C. § 841
(2000).
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Again, in such situations, opinions would certainly differ about what "reasonable
precautions" would mean. But without a safe harbor, criminal liability in these
situations would have staggering implications. It would mean that owners and
promoters would be liable regardless of whatever precautions they take. This in
turn would mean that such events-forums for speech protected by the
Constitution-are required by law to be shut down so that drug statutes do not
have the opportunity to be violated.336 Such a position seems to reverse our
hierarchy of values.337 As such, a safe harbor provision would allow liability for
owners and promoters in appropriate situations, but would help make laws more
responsive to the concerns of businesses, performing artists, and attendees.
Finally, a second proposal is that any laws expanding liability should be
strictly content-neutral, like the crack house law. To the extent that this debate is
about whether it is acceptable to impose liability on a person for maintaining
premises that they know are being used for drug activity (without encouraging or
otherwise contributing to that activity), it is important to establish that this is, in
fact, an acceptable basis for criminal culpability. But a law criminalizing
permissive conduct only at particular venues or concerning certain kinds of
speech undermines any such basis. Such a law inherently implies that the
underlying acts are not a sufficient basis for liability-that there is something
additionally wrongful about those kinds of events or speech that is necessary to
justify imposing criminal liability.
A law like the Ecstasy Awareness Act or CLEAN-UP of Methamphetamines
Act would declare that if a person runs a school where they know drug use is
occurring, they have not committed a wrong, but if they run a music event where
they know drug use is occurring, they have. This means that the mere knowledge
336 In other words, the only way not to violate the law would be to not host the event. By
implication, the event would therefore be illegal.
337 While simply using drugs in conjunction with free speech does not make the user
immune from liability, a law that makes a blanket conclusion to ban events where an owner
knows drug use will occur goes far beyond this. A Louisiana district court has noted that the
Constitution does place limits on measures that may be taken in the name of preventing drug
use. See McClure v. Ashcroft, No. 01-CV-2573-T, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2532, at *18 (E.D.
La. Feb 1. 2002), vacated on other grounds, McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003)
(ruling that third parties do not have standing to challenge a criminal plea agreement). As that
court stated:
Although this Court recognizes the perils of drug use, especially by young people, and this
Court recognizes that the intentions of the agents and prosecutors involved were pure,
when the First Amendment right of Free Speech is violated by the government in the name
of the War on Drugs and when that First Amendment violation is arguably not even
helping in the War on Drugs, it is the duty of the Courts to enjoin the government from
violating the rights of innocent people.
Id. at *17-18.
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of drug use (or even the failure to take measures to prevent drug use) is not a
sufficient basis for liability.
Alternatively, such a law may admit that knowledge of drug use is an
acceptable basis for liability in any circumstance, but that it is justifiable to apply
it only to music or entertainment events because they are somehow less valuable
to society than schools. Obviously, this involves a sensitive exercise in weighing
the subjective values of personal activities. Were the law to hinge on such
subjective weighing, it would undermine the notion that knowledge of drug use,
standing alone, is actually an acceptable basis for criminal culpability.
In this respect, an additional benefit of adding a safe harbor provision is that
laws creating liability for owners and promoters may be written more broadly.
Content-neutral drafting would avoid concerns of discrimination against music in
general or against specific kinds of music, and a safe-harbor provision would
keep the law from unfairly intruding into areas like public schools, private parties,
and college campuses. To the extent that the owners of these other premises take
reasonable precautions to prevent drug use, they will not be liable. And to the
extent that they do not take reasonable precautions, what is the justification for
not imposing liability on them, while imposing it on owners of entertainment
events? At its core, this question simply restates the underlying issues in the larger
debate: should we impose liability on owners and promoters of entertainment
events, and if so, why?
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the idea of holding landowners responsible for the actions of
persons on their property is not without precedent, its application in the context of
music, speech, or other entertainment events raises serious concerns. Because of
the tendency to link particular forms of music to drug use-as happened with jazz
and marijuana in the 1920s, psychedelic rock and LSD in the 1970s, and punk
and speed in the 1980s338-there is a dangerous likelihood that certain forms of
speech will be discriminated against in the enforcement of owner and promoter
liability laws. Events may often be targeted because of the kind of music being
played, rather than for deviating from societal or industry norms, which is the
most fundamental requirement for imposing criminal liability. However pressing
the problem of club drugs may be, the right to engage in protected speech, music,
and dance cannot be sacrificed in the name of attempting to reduce drug activity.
But there may be ways of implementing an expansion of liability for owners
and promoters without making this sacrifice. The benefits of this Note's proposed
framework are that it helps to give structure to the issues in this debate, and in
doing so offers opportunities for compromise. A safe harbor provision and neutral
338 See Brunet Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 23.
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drafting would help address some of the concerns of those who are wary of
expanding liability, without undermining the effectiveness of any such expansion.
To the extent that people oppose these suggestions, their position implies that they
would rather squelch innocent and protected conduct than accept an eminently
reasonable compromise.
Finally, even if knowledge of drug use is accepted as a viable basis for
liability, and even if laws use a safe-harbor and content-neutral drafting, there are
many remaining issues on the table, such as the appropriate level of criminal
punishment, whether civil penalties should be allowed, and guidelines to ensure
non-discriminatory enforcement.339 When considering all of these issues, it is
important to always keep in mind that-just as they are really only sub-issues in
the debate over liability for owners and promoters-this entire debate is really
only one issue in a broader discussion of how our nation's drug policy should
function as a whole, where that policy stands with respect to the rest of the world,
and what policy will best promote the safety, health, and happiness of society.
339 See Hearings: RAVE Act, supra note 19, at 24 (prepared statement of Graham Boyd,
Dir., Drug Policy Litig. Project, ACLU) (discussing recommendations for amendments to the
RAVE Act).
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